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Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are an essential part of the critical infrastructure
of society and becoming increasingly vulnerable to cyber attacks performed over
computer networks. The introduction of remote access connections combined with
mistakes in automation system configurations expose ICSs to attacks coming from
public Internet. Insufficient IT security policies and weaknesses in security features
of automation systems increase the risk of a successful cyber attack considerably.
In recent years the amount of observed cyber attacks has been on constant rise,
signaling the need of new methods for finding and protecting vulnerable automation
systems. So far, search engines for Internet connected devices, such as Shodan,
have been a great asset in mapping the scale of the problem.
In this theses methods are presented to identify and classify industrial control
systems over IP based networking protocols. A great portion of protocols used in
automation networks contain specific diagnostic requests for pulling identification
information from a device. Port scanning methods combined with more elaborate
service scan probes can be used to extract identifying data fields from an automation
device. Also, a model for automated finding and reporting of vulnerable ICS devices
is presented. A prototype software was created and tested with real ICS devices
to demonstrate the viability of the model. The target set was gathered from
Finnish devices directly connected to the public Internet. Initial results were
promising as devices or systems were identified at 99% success ratio. A specially
crafted identification ruleset and detection database was compiled to work with the
prototype. However, a more comprehensive detection library of ICS device types
is needed before the prototype is ready to be used in different environments. Also,
other features which help to further assess the device purpose and system criticality
would be some key improvements for the future versions of the prototype.
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protection
aalto-yliopisto
sähkötekniikan korkeakoulu
diplomityön
tiivistelmä
Tekijä: Tuomas Järekallio
Työn nimi: Teollisuusautomaatiojärjestelmien tunnistus ja luokittelu
IP-verkoissa
Päivämäärä: 3.8.2016 Kieli: Englanti Sivumäärä: 7+55
Tietoliikenne- ja tietoverkkotekniikan laitos
Professuuri: Tietoverkkotekniikka
Työn valvoja: Prof. Jukka Manner
Työn ohjaaja: DI Timo Kiravuo
Yhteiskunnan kriittiseen infrastruktuuriin kuuluvat teollisuusautomaatiojärjes-
telmät ovat yhä enemmissä määrin alttiita tietoverkkojen kautta tapahtuville
kyberhyökkäyksille. Etähallintayhteyksien yleistyminen ja virheet järjestelmien
konfiguraatioissa mahdollistavat hyökkäykset jopa suoraa Internetistä käsin. Puut-
teelliset tietoturvakäytännöt ja teollisuusautomaatiojärjestelmien heikot suojaukset
lisäävät onnistuneen kyberhyökkäyksen riskiä huomattavasti. Viime vuosina kyber-
hyökkäysten määrä maailmalla on ollut jatkuvassa kasvussa ja siksi tarve uusille
menetelmille haavoittuvaisten järjestelmien löytämiseksi ja suojaamiseksi on ole-
massa. Internetiin kytkeytyneiden laitteiden hakukoneet, kuten Shodan, ovat olleet
suurena apuna ongelman laajuuden kartoittamisessa.
Tässä työssä esitellään menetelmiä teollisuusautomaatiojärjestelmien tunnistami-
seksi ja luokittelemiseksi käyttäen IP-pohjaisia tietoliikenneprotokollia. Suuri osa
automaatioverkoissa käytetyistä protokollista sisältää erityisiä diagnostiikkakut-
suja laitteen tunnistetietojen selvittämiseksi. Porttiskannauksella ja tarkemmalla
palvelukohtaisella skannauksella laitteesta voidaan saada yksilöivää tunnistetietoa.
Työssä esitellään myös malli automaattiselle haavoittuvaisten teollisuusautomaa-
tiojärjestelmien löytämiselle ja raportoimiselle. Mallin tueksi esitellään ohjelmis-
toprototyyppi, jolla mallin toimivuutta testattiin käyttäen testijoukkona oikeita
Suomesta löytyviä, julkiseen Internetiin kytkeytyneitä teollisuusautomaatiolaitteita.
Prototyypin alustavat tulokset olivat lupaavia: laitteille tai järjestelmille kyettiin
antamaan jokin tunniste 99% tapauksista käyttäen luokittelussa apuna proto-
tyypille luotua tunnistekirjastoa. Ohjelmiston yleisempi käyttö vaatii kuitenkin
kattavamman automaatiolaitteiden tunnistekirjaston luomista sekä prototyypin
jatkokehitystä: tehokkaampi tunnistaminen edellyttää automaatiojärjestelmien
toimintaympäristön ja kriittisyyden tarkempaa analysointia.
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tuminen
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1 Introduction
Modern highly developed societies depend heavily on information technology and
automation systems for their every day functions. These functions range from
industrial manufacturing all the way to civil infrastructure containing power plants
and water treatment facilities. Information systems improve productivity and enable
the use of flexible remote access into management systems. However, continually
evolving networked information systems make societies more vulnerable to potential
cyber attacks.
Cyber attacks against networked automation systems has in recent years raised
the public awareness of the need for cyber security. This has been one of the key topics
while forming national security policies. In 2013, the Finnish government formed a
national cyber strategy [1] as an overall vision for protecting nationally vital key func-
tions against cyber threats. It specifies guidelines for seamless co-operation between
companies, governmental agencies and researchers to form situational awareness in
information networks and to detect, and counteract, cyber attacks.
Globally networked world enables new ways to remotely access automation
systems but it also makes them more vulnerable to malicious actors. These actors
each have their own agenda to support their interest which may be financial gain by
criminal activity, terrorism fueled by ideology or national security agencies practicing
cyber espionage. Major sections of nationally critical infrastructure rely on the
stable operation of automation systems. A wide scale cyber attack against critical
equipment, e.g. power grid, could cause widespread chaos and paralyze society’s
ability to function. Therefore it is crucial to improve protection for this infrastructure
to the highest level.
Industrial Control System (ICS) is a general term evolved to cover all types
of control systems used in industrial automation installations. This includes Su-
pervisory Control And Data Acquisition systems (SCADA) and process control
systems which utilize Programmable Logic Controls (PLC) and Remote Terminal
Units (RTU). ICSs can expand over multiple operational sites by using Distributed
Control Systems (DCS). DCS provides a multi-level control architecture containing
a supervisory control level which manages multiple sub-level supervisory and process
control functions.
SCADA systems monitor field sites by getting process status information and
controlling automation systems in the field level. Control is typically achieved by
managing feed-back or feed-forward control loops which maintain process conditions
around predefined standards. On the field level, PLCs are used to control the physical
industrial process by regulating actuators, e.g. valves, arms or pumps. PLCs are
usually complemented with RTUs which are used to gather process status information
from sensors and pass it back to SCADA system for process monitoring. Human
interaction is made possible with Human-Machine Interface (HMI) input-output
devices which provide process data to human operators and enable operators to
control the process. HMI systems typically rely on SCADA system databases and
software to present detailed diagnostic and management views over the industrial
process. This enables operators to fine tune the industrial process wherever needed.
2Figure 1: A traditional industrial control system architecture [2]
Figure 1 illustrates a traditional ICS architecture following ISA S99 security
model [2]. This sample system contains only the essential parts of a SCADA/DCS
architecture and is isolated from corporate IT network and Internet with firewalls.
System architecture is divided into several separated security levels. Level 0 contains
the physical instrumentation, e.g. valves and pumps, and sensors of industrial process.
They operate the physical machinery needed in industrial process and are directly
connected to field-level controllers and monitoring equipment, e.g. PLCs and RTUs,
which reside in level 1.
PLCs and RTUs are managed through a network connection using a Front End
Processor (FEP) as a gateway. Modern PLCs have TCP/IP stacks implemented but
legacy automation systems still use serial connections to communicate. Therefore
FEP could be needed to establish connectivity between packet based IP networks and
serial connected devices. Together with HMI terminals they provide area supervisory
operations for process control network in local control room environments (level 2).
Remote monitor and control functions are established in Area Operations DMZ
(level 3) which is connected to the process control networks through a firewall.
3SCADA systems provide high-level supervisory control over several process control
networks in multiple geographical regions. Database and historian servers are used to
collect and store monitored process data. SCADA software is typically also used to
automatically flow data to business applications which access area operations network
from corporate IT network (level 4). Corporate intranet can in most cases be remotely
accessed through a VPN connection from public Internet (level 5). Appropriate
security measures, e.g. firewalls, routers and security software, must be in place to
ensure sufficient isolation between corporate IT network and area operations network.
This thesis studies mainstream ICS IP network protocols in the cyber security
point-of-view and presents how they could be used to gather identity information
from exposed ICS devices. The feasibility of an automated system for gathering
identification fingerprints from ICS devices connected to IP networks is researched.
Moreover, this thesis also discusses whether these fingerprints are enough to provide
a sufficient dataset for reliable ICS device identification. A proof of concept network
scanner and device classifier was built to demonstrate the overall concept in practice.
41 search terms were used to gather exposed ICS devices from Shodan search
engine. Only Finnish IP addresses were collected for scan targets and safe scanning
techniques were utilized to ensure compliance with the Finnish legislation. The
prototype collected successfully usable identification data using multiple TCP and
UDP protocols. Moreover, less than a hundred identification rules were enough
to classify target devices with 99% accuracy when compared to Shodan database.
More aggressive device enumeration could improve accuracy even more; however,
the legality of such methods remain unclear as intrusive examination of computer
systems is strictly forbidden without the consent of the owner.
In the next chapter, the most common security threats to ICSs are being explored.
Reasons for common ICS security weaknesses are being analyzed while highlighting
a few possible scenarios how malicious actors can utilize them. Chapter 3 focuses on
methods for gathering identifying fingerprints from ICS devices. Several mainstream
ICS network protocols are being analyzed for their usage for device identification. Also,
the feasibility of IP traffic fingerprinting in device detection is considered. Chapter 4
describes a reference model for ICS device classification based on previously gathered
device fingerprints. This thesis focuses on rule-based classification but machine
learning is also briefly viewed. Chapter 5 presents a proof of concept prototype for
scanning IP based networks and finding exposed ICS devices. Initial testing was
carried out against ICS simulator honeypots and then with devices in real network
environment. Finally, Chapter 6 presents conclusions and ideas for future work.
42 Cyber security issues in ICS
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have been for decades an invaluable part of modern
society, managing a large portion of core functions in critical infrastructure. ICSs can
be found in most civil infrastructure, e.g. power plants, power grid, water, oil and
gas distribution, building automation as well as industrial manufacturing systems.
Historically, ICS architectures were not designed with security in mind because of
physical isolation from public networks and the use of proprietary software with
vendor specific serial protocols. Physical isolation and “security by obscurity" design
pattern were enough to keep ICSs protected from cyber attacks. However, ICSs
have not seen significant changes in architecture and protocols until very recently
when commercial off-the-shelf ICS solutions have become more commonplace in
industrial installations and IP based packet networks have been embedded within
these previously isolated systems to simplify distributed remote control. Improved
networking capabilities have also raised concern for cyber security.
Figure 2: An industrial control system over IP based mobile broadband service [2]
Figure 2 illustrates a modern cellular ICS architecture where connections between
5SCADA systems and field site are established over mobile IP network. While
bringing flexibility and ease of deployment, routable TCP/IP communication exposes
previously isolated field sites to cyber threats. With a traditional serial connection,
physical access is required to gain control over the circuit. With IP networks
this risk is increased because packets can be routed from other networks without
physical access to the field site network. Process control networks still use fieldbus
communication protocols; however, remote access is provided by gateways carrying
data over IP network. Modern PLC, RTU and HMI devices have nowadays native
IP protocol support allowing direct remote management over e.g. Telnet or SSH
protocols. Improved accessibility makes these devices vulnerable to cyber threats
if they are not properly protected. Firewalls can be helpful in securing field site
from direct attacks from the Internet. However, more advanced cyber attacks can be
indirect and the point of entry can be e.g. from inside corporate network. Therefore
it is crucial to secure all interfaces where remote control or monitoring connection
can be established.
This chapter explores the common cyber security issues in industrial control
systems. A selection of reported severe ICS incidents are presented to illustrate the
magnitude of destruction a well-placed cyber attack can cause. Systematic problems,
both technical and organizational, in networked automation systems are discussed
and the chapter is concluded by a look into the current exposure of ICS devices on
the Internet.
2.1 ICS incidents
Security incidents in industrial control systems are a significant problem. Companies
tend to suppress incident reports in fear of repercussions from governmental regulators
and businesses considered insecure can also lose a significant portion of their customer
base. A recent security study of 291 utility and energy companies in the U.S.A. [3]
revealed that 76% of the companies had suffered at least one data breach during
the previous 12 months. 21% of the companies had two or more security incidents.
Moreover, 55% of respondents valued minimizing system downtime to be the top IT
security objective whereas only 14% considered prevention of a cyber attack to be
a high priority. This is natural because automation system processes are expected
to be reliable and therefore availability is valued over data confidentiality. Meeting
regulatory requirements while protecting physical security, including personnel and
equipment, are considered more important than keeping up with data security.
According to the study the two top core systems compromised were databases
(according to 56% of respondents) and endpoints (according to 52% of respondents)
whereas only 5% of respondents said SCADA networks were compromised as a results
of a cyber attack. Cyber attacks are not in most cases crafted against SCADA systems
but the potential of a serious disaster is real and should be taken into consideration
in IT security policies.
In the past, SCADA system malfunctions have been a cause for large scale
damages and even deaths. One of the most well-known ICS incidents, the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant core meltdown in 1986 [4], has long-lasting effects for centuries.
6Less than 50 deaths has been directly attributed to the radiation from the explosion
but continuous radioactive fallout can be responsible for up to 4000 deaths. While
the accident was caused by operator errors and unsafe testing procedures of the
nuclear reactor, similar accidents are possible as a result of a cyber attack. There
has been several ICS incident reports where nuclear power plants have been infected
with computer viruses. In 2013, a malicious virus caused a shutdown of a U.S. power
plant [5] and in 2016 a German nuclear power plant [6] was hit by several viruses. In
both cases, careless handling of compromised USB drives caused computer systems
to become infected. Luckily, physical isolation from the Internet prevented data theft
and systems directly in control of the reactors were not compromised.
To this day, there are only a few publicly known examples of cyber attacks
in which a malicious actor has caused large physical damage to industrial control
systems:
– One of the most well-known and sophisticated attack was the Stuxnet computer
worm sabotaging an Iranian uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. It exploited
multiple zero-day vulnerabilities in Windows and Siemens Step7 software and
was specifically targeting PLCs and SCADA systems. When introduced to the
target system, usually via an infected USB drive, it installed rootkits to PLC
and Step7 control software and used modified code to inject unexpected and
harmful commands to the process network through PLC interfaces. In Iran it
succeeded in destroying one-fifth of all Iran’s nuclear centrifuges. The origins
of Stuxnet has not been traced but several intelligence leaks implicate United
States and Israel in developing it as a tool for cyber warfare purposes. Later
diplomatic cables obtained by Wikileaks confirmed the intentions of targeting
Iran’s nuclear program through sophisticated covert operations. [7, 8]
– In December 2014, the German federal office of information security released a
report stating that a malicious actor had gained access to control systems of
a steel mill, impacting multiple process components in ICS network resulting
them to become unregulated and cause massive physical damage in the plant.
No detailed information about the attack has been presented but according to
the report the adversary infiltrated the corporate network by sending an infected
file containing malicious code injections to an on-site employee. Infected office
computer was then used to proceed with additional attack stages into the plant
network leading to the damages in manufacturing site. Multiple breakdowns of
control components disabled partially or fully the control system preventing
the furnace to shutdown in a controlled manner. Further details about the
precise attack vectors have not been disclosed. [9]
Modern networked computer systems are under constant cyber threat of various
levels. Cyber attacks have wide range of motivations behind them and they are
performed by actors with different levels of expertise and resources. Low-threat
probing is usually done by active hobbyists trying to find single vulnerable systems
without any intention to break in. Cyber criminals are usually motivated by financial
gain or ideology. However, national intelligence agencies have vast financial support,
7manpower and technical capabilities to plan and execute advanced large-scale attacks.
Governmental supported attacks are used for espionage but also for directly disrupting
or sabotaging enemy systems. In recent years many superpower nation has added
defensive and offensive usage of cyber weapons as a part of their strategic doctrine.
USA, UK, Russia, China and Israel all have a strong presence in cyberspace operations.
Well-planned cyber attacks leave very few traces to the origin of actors, sometimes
there is no forensic evidence that an attack ever happened. Even if traces lead
somewhere, connection routing, the use of proxies or other spoofing methods can
conceal the real source of the attack. Without concrete evidence the actors can rely
on plausible deniability.
Cyber attacks are effective in a supporting role of modern warfare. One of
the recent usages was in the prolonged Ukrainian crisis. On December 23rd 2015,
Ukrainian power grid suffered from large scale outages affecting approximately 225 000
customers. Similar failures have also been reported in several other Ukrainian critical
infrastructure services. A large Ukrainian mining company and a railway company
were attacked in a similar fashion. During the cyber attacks, malicious remote
connections were discovered from outside network taking control over previously
infected ICS systems. Later system analysis found several planted malware, e.g.
KillDisk and BlackEnergy. [10] Remote connections have been traced back to a
Russian Internet service provider and hackers also made phone calls from Russia.
However, during the investigation direct Russian involvement could not be pointed
as attribution for cyber attacks is very difficult without solid proof. [11, 12]
2.2 Problems in networked automation systems
ICSs are nowadays more and more networked with outside systems. Previously ICS
had an isolated network between field site and control systems but external network
connections provide flexibility in operation and maintenance tasks. Connections
to corporate network helps with data flow from SCADA to office workers. Remote
access through Virtual Private Network (VPN) connection enables operation around
the world over any Internet connection. Centralized SCADA systems can collect
data flows from unmanned remote field sites over network connection which results
in significant operating cost reductions. Additionally, centralization helps with data
management and efficient process control over several locations.
Designing reliable and secure network access requires IT engineers who have
expertise in information security. However, most ICSs are designed by engineers
with industrial systems design as their field of knowledge. It takes both disciplines
to design an ICS that meets the safety and performance requirements and is also
protected from cyber threats. Mistakes in design can easily happen when both teams
are not working seamlessly for the same goal. Problems can also arise in installation
and operation phase when proper security policy is not followed intentionally or due
to ignorance.
Cyber security issues are caused by weaknesses in both organizational and tech-
nological policies. Cyber attacks, both internal and external, can take place when
attacker is able to penetrate all layers of security measures set in place. Modern
8ICSs, built with off-the-shelf products, benefit from standardized system components
as shorter deployment times and lower purchase costs but leave the duty of proper
configuration fully to the customer. Vendors typically ship units with well known
default passwords, out-of-date software and non-restrictive security configuration.
Oversights in installation may leave systems vulnerable for years without anyone
noticing. National agencies, e.g. National Institute for Standards and Technologies
(NIST) in the United States, have provided guidelines for ICS security [13], addressing
possible vulnerabilities in hardware, software and configuration policies. Legacy ICSs
have been designed and built before modern IT environments existed, making it hard
to bring them up-to-date with current data security standards.
2.3 Issues in organizational and technological policies
Old ICSs were not designed with security as their primary objective. System availabil-
ity, safety concerns and meeting regulatory requirements were the main design points
while physical security was also considered important. Emphasis in these design
aspects has also affected companies’ security policies. To this day, shortcomings in
security auditing, documentation and employee training are major contributors to
system vulnerability.
Malicious actors prefer social engineering for finding initial attack vectors into
an ICS system by exploiting the employees’ willingness to help: access to the office
network can be gained by sending an e-mail infected by malware to a company
secretary, or the attacker can gain physical access to the plant site disguised as
maintenance personnel. However, most organizational issues can be corrected by
implementing common security principles. [13]
Most technical security issues can be fixed by implementing proper IT security
policies. Policies for configuration management and auditing, password strength and
service management are well-known and accepted in the industry. However, ICSs
have their own unique needs which makes fixing them harder and more expensive.
Automation systems run time-constricted process controls with high availability
requirements. Equipment have slow processors and a small amount of memory
which makes encrypted networking protocols and intrusion detection systems hard to
implement as control systems are expected to respond to commands in real-time. [14]
Production downtime can cause major financial losses, therefore maintenance
windows are kept narrow and scheduled to occur rarely. Complete process equipment
overhaul is not usually possible, therefore devices are patched in smaller batches
without interrupting the control process. Systems are usually operating for their
full life-cycle which could postpone larger security upgrades for decades. Software
systems are vendor-specific and delicate in nature which makes vulnerability patching
difficult. It is also worth noting that equipment vendors prefer long-term support
contracts which prevents switching from one equipment manufacturer to another
without additional costs. A common practice in ICS maintenance is to operate the
system with minimal upgrades and try to isolate the system as well as possible. [3]
The NIST guide for ICS security proposes multiple business oriented approaches
for improving ICS security. It presents the benefits of well-documented and audited
9security management policies while explains the repercussions of leaving security
vulnerabilities in the system. It also proposes ways to improve the security of
existing ICS installations by reinforcing proper isolation of network architecture and
placement of end-point firewalls. [13]
2.4 Weaknesses in ICS network protocols
Common ICS protocols originate from an era of devices with direct serial connections.
Serial connections are physically isolated from other networks which reduces exposure
to the outside world. Cyber security was not a major concern until modern TCP/IP
networking was implemented into control system devices. In order to maintain
compatibility with old systems, protocol structure could not be changed and therefore
security features have to be provided by transport layer protocols or by isolation
from the Internet via firewalls but devices may still be subject to illicit cyber threats
originating from inside network. Command injection, data injection and denial
of service attacks leverage the lack of authentication in common control system
communication protocols. Lacking cryptographic authentication prevents devices
from validating the origin of commands and responses reliably thus making devices
inherently vulnerable to data injection attacks. Next, security issues in two widely
used ICS protocols, Modbus and Siemens S7comm, are presented as a case study.
2.4.1 Modbus
Modbus is a serial communications protocol originally developed and published by
Modicon in 1979. It is an open and simple protocol for connecting PLCs and other
industrial control system devices without any vendor specific restrictions. Modbus is
commonly used to connect a supervisory workstation into a RTU in a SCADA system.
There are binary (Modbus RTU) and text based (Modbus ASCII) serial versions
of the protocol; however, a variant for IP networks (Modbus TCP) is becoming
increasingly popular. Each device has a unique address assigned as Modbus’s 8 bit
address space provides addresses from 1 to 247. Commands can be sent out by any
device but only commands coming from devices assigned as master are executed. In
Modbus, devices executing commands are called slaves. Communication between
devices happens in pairs on packets: every query from master device is responded by
slave device.
Modbus frames are divided into Application Data Unit (ADU) and Protocol Data
Unit (PDU). PDU contains message function code and function data payload. ADU
contains PDU as payload alongside an address field and an error check field. Error
check is only used to detect transmission errors, no authentication or encryption
features are provided by Modbus protocol. The basic commands can instruct a
slave device to change or return a value of a register (16-bit value), or control the
status of an I/O coil (1-bit value). Modbus has additional functions for diagnostic
purposes; Read Device Identification (function code 43) is very useful for querying
device identification. [15]
Modbus vulnerabilities are well researched and understood in the industry and
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scientific community. Most attacks focus on man-in-the-middle scenarios but fully
remote attacks are also possible due to bugs in device firmwares. Modbus is commonly
used to read process measurement data from PLCs in a feedback loop and make
adjusting control commands in a control loop. Due to lack of any authentication, a
compromised HMI or RTU terminal exposes PLCs to several kinds of attacks. One
possible taxonomy for attacks groups them into four main categories [16]:
– Reconnaissance attacks are used to map network structure and identify devices.
Address scan walks through every valid address and creates a list of assigned
addresses by sending valid commands and waiting for responses from devices.
Similar scan is possible for finding implemented function codes in control
devices. Additionally, device identification scan can be used to gather specific
information, e.g. device make and model, serial number and firmware version.
More advanced attacks can map device data block addresses or even request a
full memory dump.
– Response injection attacks intercept responses coming from an PLC and inject
modified data into them. This can be very harmful to the process control
loop as the monitoring HMI receives altered measurements and could instruct
incorrect adjustments to the PLC. Alternatively, the attacker can craft and
inject responses to the network spoofing as the responding PLC.
– Command injection attacks are used to inject malicious commands into control
loop. Commands can have different effects based on the intentions of the
attacker. An attacker can change the field site process state from safe to
abnormal or even critical, usually by injecting commands that change the
states of system actuators, e.g. pumps, valves and switches, controlled by PLCs.
A repeated change of actuator states can cause physical and permanent damage
to system components. Instead of sending harmful commands, the attacker can
alter parameters or set point values (register values) used by process control
routines on a PLC and cause the system to behave incorrectly.
– Denial of service attacks try to break communication between management sys-
tem and field site preventing monitoring and control of the system. An attacker
can try to overload slave devices by flooding a large amount of malformed
packets to a PLC causing it to slow down or even crash. Radio links with
carrier sense can be jammed by continuous radio transmission on the channel.
PLC devices have limited computing resources and therefore an attacker may
be able render them inoperable by injecting a constant heavy stream of request
packets.
These attack vectors pose a significant risk for ICSs. Researchers have presented
and confirmed 28 possible attacks against Modbus control systems. [16] These attacks
exploited architectural weaknesses in Modbus protocol and the suggested ways of
cyber attack mitigation are sufficient system isolation and implementation of proper
intrusion detection system to reinforce digital forensic capabilities of the company.
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2.4.2 Siemens S7comm
S7 communication is a proprietary network protocol for S7 series PLCs developed
and maintained by Siemens. It is used to program PLCs with Siemens Step7 software
tools, exchange data between PLCs and access PLCs from SCADA systems for
data request and diagnostic purposes. S7 series PLCs use PROFINET, a fieldbus
protocol based on Ethernet, which supports multiple network layer protocols including
TCP/IP. TCP connectivity is handled with ISO-TSAP compatibility protocol which
handles encapsulation between transport layer and session layer protocols. ISO-TSAP
packets are sent in plain text which makes reverse engineering and data injection
easy for attacker. An attacker can capture and replicate several operator tasks, e.g.
turning off the CPU, disabling memory protection or injecting PLC with malicious
code.
A presentation made for Black Hat conference in 2011 introduced multiple possible
attack vectors for exploiting Siemens S7 PLCs: [17]
– S7 protocol is vulnerable to packet capturing and replay attacks. An attacker
can extract valuable data from TCP stream between engineering workstation
and PLC, and reuse it to generate new commands authenticated as the user.
– User authentication is based on a password hash sent to PLC and compared to
the one located on PLC’s memory. A captured hash can be reused because
connection sessions never expire between the client and the PLC. Additionally,
Siemens PLCs lack checks for session validity which enables the attacker to
reuse preexisting sessions on any other PLC of the same model. It is also
possible to collect captured packets into a library for brute force password
cracking.
– PLCs are vulnerable to specifically crafted packets forcing the device to raise
an error condition that causes the CPU to go into STOP state. This will cause
any equipment connected to the PLC to halt resulting in unpredictable and
possibly dangerous situation.
– With special probe requests it is possible to read and rewrite logic on the PLC.
Changes to the ladder logic and data block may cause serious damage to the
process.
– Replay attacks can be used to directly read from and write to PLC memory
blocks. Memory rewrites can be used to reprogram system configuration, inject
malicious code or send payload data to execute a remote shell connection.
Since 2011 Siemens has patched numerous security vulnerabilities in S7 PLCs
but the overall architecture has remained the same. The recommended approach on
minimizing the risk of exploitation is to limit exposure to non-restricted networks
for all control system devices.
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2.5 Current exposure of ICS devices on the Internet
Modern Internet has evolved into a global fabric connecting billions of devices,
Internet of Things (IoT). Connectivity between computers, smart phones, televisions
and other home appliances helps to automate daily tasks. However, the same network
contains also incorrectly configured industrial automation systems with open ports
that present a great threat to national cyber security. Situational awareness in
cyberspace is considered of great importance and techniques have been developed to
help finding and securing critical automation system on the Internet.
An extensive research effort called Internet Census 2012 [18] scanned every public
IPv4 address in the world between June and October 2012. The project was carried
out by an anonymous researcher and all research data was released for free. The
scan exploited vulnerable embedded devices to form a distributed scanning network
of over 400 000 devices, named Carna botnet. Although the researcher gained access
to the devices by using default credentials, the actions would be considered illegal
in most countries. During the scanning period 420 million IP addresses responded
to ICMP ping request at least twice and were targeted for more advanced scanning
techniques. The results of the scan contained terabytes of data about open ports,
used software, trace routes, reverse DNS queries and other valuable information for
researchers around the world to analyze.
2.5.1 Shodan
Shodan is a search engine for finding specific types of devices connected to the
Internet. Shodan scans the whole Internet in constant cycles and saves findings
into a database where users can query data using a variety of filters. Shodan was
launched in 2009 as a side project for John Matherly who was interested to determine
how many embedded devices were connected to the Internet, initially scanning just
four services in each device: FTP, SSH, Telnet and HTTP. Since then the scanning
capabilities have improved significantly and Shodan is currently probing over 200
different services. In order to shorten scan times, Shodan uses a network of distributed
scanning nodes. Scan database combines host information, geographical IP info,
open ports and data from each service probe, operating system detection and other
useful data for each scanned device. [19]
Shodan provides useful information for multiple different purposes. Researchers
benefit from the comprehensive data set of devices currently connected to the Internet
and it helps them to prove exposure of devices based on empirical data. Companies
can use Shodan to ensure that their network domain does not contain any exposed
devices. Software companies can get statistics about the usage of their software. The
free availability of metadata enables the search engine to be used either as a tool for
improving security or as a cyber weapon. Shodan can be used to perform intelligence
gathering while planning a cyber attack against vulnerable targets but the benefits
outweigh threats in terms of improving cyber security.
Cyber security researchers have utilized Shodan in efforts to find vulnerable
devices of critical infrastructure. Project SHINE (Shodan Intelligence Extraction)
was based on intelligence gathered from Shodan between April 2012 through January
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2014. The main objective of the project was to define a reliable search term set to
identify industrial control system devices of critical infrastructure. The set contains
not just control systems but also the supporting infrastructure devices. The research
team compiled a search term set on 927 items and was able to discover over 500 000
ICS devices from Shodan database. The team was able to conclude that most device
exposures appeared accidental due to poorly configured network infrastructure. [20]
2.5.2 The exposure in Finland
Researchers from a cyber security company Nixu analyzed the Internet Census data
set to map current Finnish cyber landscape. [21] 13 782 236 Finnish IP addresses
were selected from data set and analyzed for statistics. It was discovered that almost
95% of scanned hosts had 4 or less open ports, an amount considered fairly healthy.
A relatively high number of devices provided insecure protocol access, e.g. Telnet
and FTP, making it possible to capture sensitive data or user credentials from the
wire. A large amount of services handling sensitive information, 7650 databases, were
found to be directly accessible from the Internet. Out of all available services, 326
high-, 577 medium- and 82 low-level unique vulnerabilities with CVE identifiers were
discovered where old Apache web server and PHP versions were the most common
vulnerable software. Regarding exposed web management interfaces, the Nixu report
also pointed out that after a device is installed, usually no additional configuration or
hardening is done, leaving the device with unwanted services listening on all possible
network interfaces. In worst case scenario, the remote management interfaces are
available with default credentials or no password at all. Over 50 000 web interfaces
of embedded devices, printers, routers or surveillance systems were discovered while
dissecting the data set. HTTP, HTTPS, SSH, Telnet, FTP and SMTP were revealed
to be the protocols most commonly available in Finnish cyberspace. In detailed service
probe analysis, the report presented possible SCADA related servers, illustrated in
figure 3. Devices running Windows CE operating system were excluded and in total
there were over 4100 SCADA related hits.
Another Finnish research project in Aalto University has mapped Finnish in-
dustrial automation systems exposed to the Internet. [22] The research conducted
custom search queries on the Shodan search engine using 41 distinctive keywords to
find devices manufactured by the most common vendors of industrial control systems,
power management systems, building automation and remote access servers. Original
research was conducted in early 2013 and it was revisited 8 months later to observe
any changes. The first query revealed 2915 unique IP addresses for suspected ICS
devices of which 1968 devices were confirmed to be on-line. The second query showed
an increase of about 60% at 4695 unique IP addresses of which 3281 devices were
found to be on-line. Most of the IP addresses were assigned to building automation
and power management systems and the rest belonged to industrial automation
systems. During the writing of this thesis, Shodan was queried again with the same
set of keywords, 2 years after the original research, to investigate the current level of
exposed automation system devices. Queries were made 4 times, from September
to December in 2015, to observe monthly variation in devices on-line. Results were
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Figure 3: Internet Census 2012 - possible Finnish SCADA systems with web-
access [21]
fairly unexpected as the amount of unique IP addresses had reduced down consider-
ably. The amount of queried addresses fluctuated roughly between 1500 and 2000
month-to-month as can be seen in figure 4 below.
Figure 4: ICS devices found in Finland by Shodan in 2013 and 2015
One possible explanation for lower IP address count could be improvements in
Shodan database refresh algorithms and purging of outdated database records. This
theory is supported by the fact that about 20% to 30% of unique IP addresses were
removed from Shodan query results between each month and new IP addresses were
discovered. Most of these addresses were in dynamically allocated address pools and
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hence could be discarded from the database after being reassigned to another host.
New addresses belonged most likely to already discovered devices but this remained
unconfirmed as scan data does not identify devices individually. It is also possible
that these devices have been since taken off-line or protected by firewalls.
The research project also compared Finland with 8 other countries similar in the
level of industrialization and Internet coverage. [22] Again, Shodan was queried with
53 carefully selected search terms to find an unbiased sample of ICS devices globally.
A total of 132 775 unique IP addresses were found. After applying country filters,
Finland held 2,48% of all queried devices based on the geographical locations of IP
addresses. When the results were scaled by population of the country, Finland was
discovered to have almost 0,6 exposed ICS devices per 1000 inhabitants, more than
any other country. This query was revisited in 2015 to see if the landscape of cyber
exposure had improved. With the same search terms, a total of 117 724 unique IP
addresses were found. Finland held 2,45% of those addresses which translates into
0,53 devices per 1000 inhabitants. Figures 5 and 6 below illustrate the results. It
can be concluded that the exposure has not decreased and new methods for finding
and securing ICS devices are still much in demand.
Figure 5: The distribution of exposed ICS devices
Concern about the sufficient protection of critical cyber infrastructure has been a
catalyst for national cyber protection platforms. One of these is Havaro, a system
for monitoring network traffic with early warning capabilities, alerting on incoming
and outgoing suspicious intrusive activity. The system was developed and deployed
by the Finnish Cyber Emergency Response Team (CERT-FI) in co-operation with
companies and government agencies operating on critical infrastructure. Havaro
consists of intrusion detection sensors placed in the border between public Internet
and private networks. Sensors monitor traffic and report any suspicious activity to
central computers for analysis. Data is further used to provide situational awareness
in cyberspace for companies, Internet service providers and CERT-FI. [23]
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Figure 6: Exposed ICS devices per capita
2.6 Summary
Networked industrial control systems provide easy remote management and cost-
efficiency but poorly designed network architectures combined with misconfigured
remote access interfaces pose great threat for cyber security and could lead to horrific
industrial accidents. Due to lacking security features in common ICS network proto-
cols, firewalls and other means of network isolation should be carefully implemented
whenever possible. However, Shodan and other scanning tools used today reveal
a lot of exposed ICS devices on the Internet which indicates that companies don’t
value information security at the same level as physical security or personnel safety.
As systems become more connected, the amount of exposed devices is on the rise
as well. Luckily, research teams work relentlessly with national cyber emergency
response teams to map and alert the owners of exposed and vulnerable ICS devices.
In addition, national intrusion detection systems have been deployed to provide
better situational awareness in cyberspace.
In the next chapter, fingerprinting methods for reliable ICS device identification
are discussed.
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3 Fingerprinting ICS devices in IP networks
Modern Internet ecosystem connects billions of devices together which makes it
difficult to find a specific device among others without knowing the correct IP
address. A wide range of scanning tools and other software have been developed to
help finding and identifying devices. Tools, e.g. port scanners, can be invaluable for
national cyber security in finding exposed and vulnerable devices that control critical
automation infrastructure. In this chapter, port scanning over IP protocol is viewed
as a method of extracting device identification fingerprints for later analysis. Both
pros and cons of port scanning are discussed and a set of common ICS protocols as
well as OS fingerprinting and geolocation are proposed as possible data sources for
ICS fingerprinting. To conclude the chapter, legality issues of device probing are
pondered and scanning methods conforming with Finnish legislation are proposed.
3.1 Port scan as a fingerprinting method
Port scan is a process where scanner sends client requests to a target computer in
order to gather information, e.g. open ports or available network services. In IP
networks a scanner can target TCP and UDP ports to find responsive services. If a
service responds in an open port, scanner can proceed with more advanced scanning
techniques to identify the service. The legality of a port scan depends on motivations
tied to it. Neutral port scan without aggressive service probing can be seen as a
way to audit cyber security of the network and therefore improve overall security.
On the other hand, a scan done with intent of malicious service exploitation can be
classified as a cyber attack and considered illegal activity.
Scanning IP addresses for open services is a straightforward process. The difficulty
lies in reliable device identification based on responses from the device. Therefore,
the scanner needs to know which ports to scan and how to probe available services
to collect the most accurate and condense set of identifying information. The formed
data set has two quality requirements: no two devices can have the same set of
identifying data and the set has to remain stable over time. Probing the device and
compiling the data set is known as device fingerprinting. Unfortunately, fingerprinting
is never 100% accurate process and insufficient amount of fingerprints in decision
making can lead to both missed identifications and false positive identifications.
Scanner has to be consistent in both scanning methods and data collection. Target
devices on the other hand can be configured to provide misleading information or
deny probes for the service. Scanner has to filter responses for relevant data fields
and collect only valuable data for device identification process. Calculated device
fingerprints are saved and forwarded to a classifier which compares them to the
previously known responses from similar devices and tries to reliably identify the
device. This is known as classification and is discussed more in chapter 4.
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3.2 Issues in device scanning
Scanner may run into several obstacles during the scan process. The most common
problem is a lack of response from the device or blocked service ports, usually due to
a firewall. Even if the service responds on the port, it may block all scanning efforts
or accept connections only with encrypted, proprietary protocols. This prevents the
scanner from gathering any service information and therefore hinders the possibility
of a successful identification.
Depending on the network configuration, the ICS device can be placed behind
routers or gateways. Packets sent to a port of an IP address can be forwarded to
a different device which means that one public IP address can represent multiple
devices on the inside local area network. Therefore, the scanner cannot assume that
one target IP address is dedicated to a single device.
ICS devices are known to have limitations in processing capacity. They are
designed to have real-time responsiveness in the control loop while management
interfaces and network stack run on lower priority. Users typically experience this as
slow response times from the device. Scanning software has to take this slowness
into account by adjusting connection timeout values. A long timeout increases scan
times but a timeout too short closes the connection before client has a chance to
respond, resulting in loss of possibly valuable response data.
3.3 Data sources for fingerprinting
To ensure efficient fingerprinting process, the scanner should only query data sources
that provide useful identification data. In IP protocol networking this means scanning
a specific selection of ports used in networking between ICS devices. In addition,
analysis of TCP flows can be used to fingerprint operating system running on
the target device and GeoIP databases are useful for locating the target device
geographically. The combination of all available data sources ensure the best possible
identification match for the device.
In Internet protocols there are 65535 possible ports for services connecting through
TCP or UDP sockets. Scanning every port on every target host would be time-
consuming and provides diminishing returns compared to enumerating a selection of
ports used by popular services in ICS devices. Previous research efforts in project
SHINE have mapped the most common services used in ICS networks. [20] Devices
typically have multiple services open, many of which are considered general Internet
protocols while a few of them are vendor specific automation protocols. Next, a
few popular services are explored and their properties for device fingerprinting are
evaluated. Sample scan results are presented for most protocols, detected with a
prototype scanner which is discussed further in chapter 5.
3.3.1 Common network protocols
A few common protocols used in ICS devices are HTTP(S), FTP and SNMP. They
are not ICS specific and have more generic use cases. However, they leak information
in server responses which is useful in fingerprinting the device.
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HTTP
Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is an request-response application protocol
originally designed to transfer hypermedia content. [24] The default port for HTTP
server is TCP port 80 although vendor specific web servers are known to be bound
on numerous other ports as well. Most new ICS devices have an HTTP server
implemented to provide a remotely accessible web management system. In most
cases, it is sufficient to send a single GET request to pull the web server front page
and gather descriptive fingerprints for device type. HTTP responses include useful
descriptive system information in server headers, e.g. server software version and
descriptions of access-protected objects in www-authenticate header fields as the
defined realm name is usually preconfigured by the device manufacturer. Response
payload (the HTML document) may contain valuable information, the most valuable
being document title but other tags may also be worth a keyword search.
Listing 1: Captured HTTP server header
status : HTTP /1.1 401 Unauthorized
request type : GET
title : Digi One SP&nbsp;Configuration and Management
transfer -encoding : chunked
server : Allegro -Software -RomPager /3.12
connection : close
location : /
content -type : text/html
www -authenticate : Basic realm="Digi One SP"
HTTPS
Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) improves the security of HTTP
by enabling transmission over encrypted SSL/TLS layer and is usually bound to
TCP port 443. A crucial part of this encryption is connection signing with a digital
certificate. The certificate can be self-signed or signed by a trusted certificate authority
(CA) and contains detailed information about the certificate subject, following the
X.509 cryptography standard. [25] If the certificate is properly filled and signed by
a trustworthy CA, the certificate can reveal information about the organization or
company subject to the certificate including name and physical location.
FTP
File Transfer Protocol (FTP) has been used to transfer files between devices for
decades and is considered one of the base protocols of the Internet. The protocol
utilizes two-port connectivity: separate ports are used for control channel and data
channel. Port 21 on the server-side is used to establish control channel after which
data channel is established to client port 20. If the client requests passive connection
mode, data channel is established originating from client-side to some other port on
server-side. FTP includes a clear-text protocol for authentication but anonymous
login is also possible if the server allows it. Identifying information can be gathered in
several stages: After connection has been opened, the server sends a welcome greeting
(a login banner) which usually contains at least server software name and version
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but can also contain additional text, e.g. device or system name. If anonymous
access is allowed, any user may login without credentials by giving an e-mail address
as a password. Then, more information about the system can be recorded by, e.g.
listing available files in the home directory. The range of user actions is limited by
the server configuration; however, there are legal limitations on how the scanner can
proceed without infringing privacy. [26]
Listing 2: Scanned FTP service
ftp -anon : No (FTP code 530)
banner : VxWorks FTP server (VxWorks 5.4) ready.
SNMP
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is a standard communications proto-
col for collecting, organizing and modifying information about managed devices on
IP networks. Managed devices include routers, switches, bridges and other network
elements. By default the SNMP agent software listens on UDP port 161. SNMP
presents management data in the form of a hierarchical data tree where each available
management data object is accessed with a unique object identifier (OID). Meta-
data for each OID is described by Management Information Bases (MIB). Network
management stations, the clients, can send queries to devices running SNMP agent
software which handles requests and manages data on the device. Most devices
have SNMP configured to provide detailed system information for public access.
This includes system description, system name and possibly even location of the
device. [27]
Listing 3: System description queried with SNMP
1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1.0 : TAC Xenta911 5.1.6 -11. Copyright 2006 by TAC AB, Malmo ,
Sweden
3.3.2 Terminal connection protocols
Direct terminal connections are still needed for managing networked devices over
command line interface. They have low resource requirements and client access
is possible from any computer with a keyboard attached. Telnet is a client-server
protocol that provides widely supported bidirectional virtual terminal facilities. Due
to not having encryption, Telnet has been replaced by Secure Shell (SSH) protocol
in some modern systems.
Telnet
Standard server port for Telnet is TCP port 23; however, multiple serial connection
gateways prefer other ports. In Telnet connection, after negotiating terminal options a
full-duplex line-buffered virtual terminal device is activated and the user is presented
with a prompt. At this stage, the server typically sends a greeting banner which may
reveal system and software information. Depending on the configuration, the server
may then require login credentials or directly open a terminal session. [28]
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Listing 4: Telnet banner captured after successful connection handshake
banner : Welcome to the Windows CE Telnet Service on TPC -650H\r\n\r\nlogin:
SSH
SSH has its own handshake protocol in connection initialization. After an SSH
connection has been established, usually into server TCP port 22, both server and
client are required to send a line-terminated identification string. The string contains
requested protocol version (1 or 2) and the software version. This string is useful
because it will reveal the server software version and whether it will accept vulnerable
SSH version 1 connections. Key exchange begins immediately after this. SSH uses
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for verifying the identity of the server which makes
the fingerprint of server’s public key an unique identifier that can be used in device
identification process. [29]
Listing 5: Detected OpenSSH server
sshv1 : No
version : SSH -2.0- OpenSSH_7 .0
fingerprint : 1024 97:d5:93:3e:db:e9:e4:3a:db:13:9f:c7 :00:04:1c:bd (DSA)
3.3.3 ICS specific protocols
Most vendor supplied ICS management tools and PLC programmers utilize protocols
specifically designed for the needs of ICS environments. These protocols have built-in
dedicated functions for querying device information. A selection of common ICS
protocols, and how they can be used to gather device information, are presented
next.
BACnet
BACnet is a network protocol used specifically in building automation and control
networks for applications, e.g. heating, ventilation and air-conditioning units. Build-
ing automation systems are widely adopted in corporate networks which makes them
interesting targets. The protocol enables information exchange between automation
devices of different use classes and utilizes UDP port 47808 for connectivity. Interop-
erability is provided by using object-oriented model, where every object has a set of
standardized properties and they provide services to other objects. Every device has
identifying property fields that can be queried by other devices. These fields define
object parameters (identifier, name, type), vendor specific parameters (vendor name,
device model, firmware, application version) and optional fields revealing location
and descriptive data. In addition to querying individual devices, BACnet enables
device discovery by connecting each subnet through a gateway known as BACnet
Broadcast Management Device (BBMD). Each BBMD in BACnet network has a
synchronized Broadcast Distribution Table (BDT) which contains all BBMDs in
the network. By querying BDT from a gateway the scanner can learn every subnet
containing devices in the BACnet network. Additional registered BACnet devices
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outside these subnets can be found by querying a Foreign Device Table (FDT) from
the gateway. [30]
Listing 6: Detected air-conditioning unit with BACnet
Application Software : 2010 -01 -28
Firmware : 1.1.28s
Location : Street
Model Name : City
Vendor Name : IVprodukt
Vendor ID : Siemens Schweiz AG (Formerly: Landis & Staefa Division Europe) (7)
Object -identifier : 98
Description : City
S7Comm
Siemens S7 PLCs communicate over S7Comm proprietary protocol which can be
used to query information from devices. S7comm establishes IP connections with
ISO-TSAP compatibility layer protocol and utilizes TCP as its transport protocol
in port 102. An independent research group called SCADA Strangelove, focused on
ICS cyber security, has researched extensively vulnerabilities of popular devices, e.g.
Siemens PLCs. [31] The group has developed and released multiple tools for scanning
and fingerprinting of ICS devices. For Siemens S7 series PLCs they have developed
methods for gathering device identification by sending specifically crafted S7Comm
requests over Connection-Oriented Transport Protocol (COTP) connection transport
protocol. By parsing the response packets the scanner is able to extract device
information, e.g. device name, model, firmware information and plant location. [32]
Listing 7: Detected Siemens Simatic PLC
Version : 3.2.10
Copyright : Original Siemens Equipment
Module Type : IM151 -8 PN/DP CPU
Module : 6ES7 151-8AB01 -0AB0
Serial Number : S C-E4TC76412014
System Name : ET200S_PN_01
Plant Identification : None
Basic Hardware : 6ES7 151-8AB01 -0AB0
Modbus
Modbus is an open serial communications protocol developed to connect PLCs and
other ICS devices without vendor specific restrictions. It has a variant used for
connecting devices over TCP/IP networks by using TCP port 502. The protocol
specification defines multiple useful function codes that can be used to identify
Schneider Electric / Modicon devices and other PLCs supporting the protocol. Two
useful function codes for querying information are 43 and 90. However, some vendors
have not implemented support for these functions in their hardware. Function 43
(Read Device Identification) is used to test if the target device supports Modbus. If
the device supports function 43, it will return identification data containing vendor
name, module model, CPU type and firmware info. Even if the device returns an
error code, we still know that it supports Modbus protocol. The second proprietary
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function code, number 90, is reserved and used for uploading and downloading ladder
logic to the Schneider Electric PLC over insecure, unauthenticated connection. It
can be used to pull and extract project file information from the PLC. Malicious
actor may also use this function to overwrite existing ladder logic program on the
PLC and severely harm the controller and the process it is managing. [15]
Listing 8: Sample Modbus device [33]
Vendor Name : Schneider Electric
Network Module : BMX NOE 0100
CPU Module : BMX P34 2000
Firmware : V2.60
Memory Card : BMXRMS008MP
Project Information : Project - V4.0
Project File Name : Project.STU
Project Revision : 0.0.9
Project Last Modified : 7/11/2013 5:55:33
Niagara Fox
Niagara Fox, develop by Tridium, is a proprietary network protocol used in Trid-
ium building automation systems worldwide. It handles both station-to-station
and workbench-to-station connectivity over TCP port 1911. By using a specifically
crafted query packet, device identification data can be pulled from any active station.
Response contains a wide range of descriptive data, e.g. host name and address,
application versions, Java virtual machine details, vendor name and running oper-
ating system of the device. Additionally, the device can return location name if
configured. [33]
Listing 9: Detected Vykon brand building automation system
VM Name : Java HotSpot(TM) Server VM
Brand ID : vykon
Host Address : 192.168.196.201
Application Version : 3.7.106.4
Fox Version : 1.0.1
VM Version : 23.7-b01
Application Name : Station
Host ID : Win -6F71 -0080 -FFFC -BB77
OS Name : Windows 7
VM UUID : 8d586c11 -523c-43f0 -9748 -4 c1552bd70e9
Station name : <REMOVED >
Timezone : Europe/Helsinki
OS Version : 6.1
ID : 379279
Host Name : <REMOVED >
PC Worx
PC Worx protocol is used to program and communicate with Phoenix Contact
ILC PLCs. The protocol is proprietary and uses TCP port 1962 for connections
between devices. After connection has been established, a session ID is formed for
the remaining of the connection. After that the scanner can pull device identification
data with a single request. Device response contains PLC type, model number and
firmware info. [33]
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Listing 10: Sample PC Worx system [33]
PLC Type : ILC 330 ETH
Model Number : 2737193
Firmware Version : 3.95T
Firmware Date : Mar 2 2012
Firmware Time : 09:39:02
OMRON FINS
OMRON Global makes industrial and manufacturing machinery, and uses proprietary
FINS protocol for remote access over network interfaces. The protocol has variants for
both TCP and UDP connectivity and uses port 9600 for traffic. Device information
can be pulled with Read Controller Status request. Response from the device contains
vendor model and version number as well as current device state info. [33]
Listing 11: Sample OMRON system [33]
Controller Model : CJ2M -CPU32 02.01
Controller Version : 02.01
For System Use :
Program Area Size : 20
IOM size : 23
No. DM Words : 32768
Timer/Counter : 8
Expansion DM Size : 1
No. of steps/transitions : 0
Kind of Memory Card : 0
Memory Card Size : 0
ProConOS
ProConOS is a PLC runtime engine for embedded and PC based control applications.
A proprietary network protocol is used to exchange data between PLCs and to
program and administer control systems from MULTIPROG workstation. PLCs
are accessible through TCP port 20547 and only one request packet is needed to
get identification data from the device. The response contains ladder logic runtime
status, PLC type, firmware version and the name of the running project file. [33]
Listing 12: Sample ProConOS system [33]
Ladder Logic Runtime : ProConOS V3 .0.1040 Oct 29 2002
PLC Type : ADAM5510KW 1.24 Build 005
Project Name : 510- projec
Boot Project : 510- projec
Project Source Code : Exist
Ethernet/IP
Ethernet/IP is an open standard for industrial Ethernet developed by Rockwell
Automation. Together with Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) it provides an object-
oriented framework for real-time control applications and other automation functions.
Devices using this protocol can be queried by sending an request function List Identity
to TCP port 44818. Response from the device contains information, e.g. vendor
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ID, product name and serial number, device type, product code, device revision and
internal configured IP address. [34, 33]
Listing 13: Sample Ethernet/IP system [33]
Vendor : Rockwell Automation/Allen -Bradley (1)
Product Name : 1769- L32E Ethernet Port
Serial Number : 0x000000
Device Type : Communications Adapter (12)
Product Code : 158
Revision : 3.7
Device IP : 192.168.1.1
3.3.4 Remote operating system fingerprinting
Modern IP networking establishes interconnectivity between a plethora of different
devices. Due to vendor specific software, subtle differences in network stack im-
plementations enables operating system (OS) fingerprinting and identification of
the precise version running on a target host. Advanced probing methods combined
with pre-calculated heuristic database can be used to directly identify thousands
of different device models as well as operating systems they run. OS detection can
provide coarse-grained, e.g. Linux vs. Windows, as well as fine-grained, e.g. detecting
the version of the Linux kernel, differentiation.
There are two main approaches to the classification: detection with automatic
machine learning algorithms or the use of database containing previously collected
entries of known operating systems.
Machine learning algorithms try to automatically generate suitable OS fingerprints
by using large training data pool of different OS instances. A research paper was
released in 2010 discussing the possibilities and limitations of using machine learning
in OS detection. The premise of using automatic algorithms seemed feasible. However,
during their research the group concluded that this method faces significant technical
challenges in generating reliable and accurate OS detection fingerprints. First, target
probing may encounter random, non-OS related variation in traffic flow and header
field options that are difficult to automatically exclude from training data set. This
leads to overfitting of a classification model and limited accuracy in host detection.
Second, generated fingerprints tend to be biased towards the distribution of operating
system hosts in training set which may not represent real world environment and thus
hinders the accuracy of fingerprints. Third, fine-grained classification granularity
becomes difficult as the small observed differences in packets may be caused by
external factors instead of being actual implementation differences. Fourth, machine
learning algorithms have limited understanding of relation between network protocols
and packet fields. The researchers found that it takes human expertise to fully make
use of all little intrigued semantics of a network protocol in the effort for reliable OS
fingerprint generation. [35]
Another classification model is based on comparing probing results to a previously
compiled database of known OS fingerprints. One example of fingerprinting tools using
this model is called Nmap. Nmap works by sending out 16 specifically crafted TCP,
UDP and ICMP probe packets to known open and closed ports of the target host. A
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set of tests are run for response packets and results are condensed into host fingerprint.
Host fingerprint is then matched against the database and the closest matching OS
entries are returned. Closeness is determined by fine-tuned heuristic algorithms
that emphasize certain fingerprint features over others. Listing 14 illustrates the
compiled host fingerprint and possible closest matches from Nmap’s database. Nmap
is efficient but keeping the classification database up-to-date is cumbersome and
requires manual tweaking. New OS versions may require a completely new set of
probing packets for feature extraction and reliable differentiation. [36]
Listing 14: Nmap OS detection
Host fingerprint:
SCAN(V=6.40%E=4%D=12/4% OT=23%CT=21%CU =161%PV=N%DS=7%DC=I%G=N%TM =56618 DD0%P=x86_64 -
unknown -linux -gnu)
SEQ(CI=RD%TS=U)
OPS(O1=M218%O2=%O3=%O4=%O5=%O6=)
WIN(W1 =2000% W2=0%W3=0%W4=0%W5=0%W6=0)
ECN(R=Y%DF=N%T=3E%W=2000%O=M218%CC=N%Q=)
T1(R=Y%DF=N%T=3E%S=O%A=S+%F=AS%RD=0%Q=)
T2(R=Y%DF=Y%T=2A%W=0%S=Z%A=S%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)
T3(R=N)
T4(R=Y%DF=Y%T=1E%W=0%S=A%A=O%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=)
T5(R=Y%DF=N%T=2D%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)
T6(R=Y%DF=Y%T=25%W=0%S=A%A=O%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=)
T7(R=Y%DF=N%T=22%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)
U1(R=Y%DF=Y%T=3E%IPL=8E%UN=0% RIPL=G%RID=G%RIPCK=G%RUCK=G%RUD=G)
IE(R=Y%DFI=N%T=3E%CD=S)
OS match: Digi PortServer TS serial -to -Ethernet bridge , propability 94%
OS match: Digi PortServer TS 4 serial -to-Ethernet bridge , propability 90%
OS match: Digi PortServer TS 16 Rack serial -to-Ethernet bridge , propability 86%
OS match: Digi One SP serial -to-Ethernet bridge , propability 86%
OS match: Digi PortServer TS 4 H MEI serial -to-Ethernet bridge , propability 85%
3.3.5 Geolocation
If direct device probing does not reveal the location of the device, subsequent method
is to try geolocate its IP address. Regional Internet Registries (RIR) are organizations
that allocate and register IP address blocks for Internet Service Providers (ISP) under
their jurisdiction. RIRs register information of every assigned address block into a
who-is database. Likewise, ISPs can add information of their customers, e.g. customer
name, e-mail, location or contact info, when assigning IP addresses. However, most
customers do not register static address blocks but use dynamic address allocation
for their networking needs. Therefore, who-is database usually has ISP information
associated with their allocated address blocks. [37]
Most geolocation databases are based on RIR who-is entries. Database accuracy
can be improved by collecting customer location data from 3rd party sources. Only
relying on RIR database results in major inaccuracy as IP address blocks are not
fixed to any geographical location and they may get reassigned when needed. Also,
dynamically leased addresses for customer connections come from a larger address pool
and does not represent the actual location of the device. Therefore, geolocation based
on IP address can be very inaccurate and should not be relied on for precise location
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data. However, geolocation has its place in various applications, e.g. visualizing
purposes over larger geographical areas.
MaxMind is one of the companies producing and providing multiple constantly
updated geolocation databases for their customers. It claims to reach 99,8% accuracy
in detecting the correct country of the IP address. For another database containing
city level geolocations, in the USA, 90% accuracy is claimed for recognizing the
correct state and 84% accuracy for the correct city within 50 km distance of the
true location. The accuracy varies depending on the country and may be below the
minimum required level for any practical purpose. In Finland, MaxMind claims only
53% accuracy in detecting the correct city of the IP address within 50 km distance
of the actual location. [38]
3.4 Legality concerns
Active network scanning methods may face serious legality concerns, depending on
the legislation of each country. Even if the scan was done with good intentions, it may
be considered illegal according to the law. Researchers and security auditors have
to be very careful to stay inside the legal boundaries set by local legislation. Even
though law enforcement officers have more rights for surveillance when investigating
crimes, that does not cover actions for crime prevention and the improvement of
overall cyber security.
In this section, a brief look is taken into Finnish criminal law related to commu-
nications offenses and how scanning should be conducted while staying inside legal
boundaries.
3.4.1 Finnish legislation regarding communications
In the Finnish criminal law, communications offenses are covered in chapter 38. In
the chapter 38 the relevant parts for network scanning are the parts described in
sections §5 to §8. Additionally, in chapter 34 section §9 is relevant by disallowing
the endangerment of any computer system.
– Sections §5 and §6 criminalize the disturbing of communication transmissions.
In normal cases a security scanner does not do anything to prevent the normal
operation of the network. However, if the scanning process is too time-efficient
and sends a huge amount of probing packets in a small time frame, it risks over-
loading the transmission link capacity or blocking the resource-limited network
stacks of ICS devices. Therefore, scanning process should always implement
some rate-limiting mechanism in order to avoid the possible interruption of
normal target system operation.
– Section §7 disallows disturbing or interrupting the normal operation of a
computer system by inputting, transferring, damaging, altering or removing
any data related to it. To comply with this requirement, the scanner cannot do
anything that may change the state of the target system. Scanning software
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should always avoid the use of any hacking or exploiting tools available and
only use safe probing methods that are within protocol specifications.
– Section §8 forbids breaking in a computer system by using illegally acquired
credentials or through a security breach by making use of a system vulnerability.
Section §8 also indicates that login attempts with factory default credentials or
brute forcing are not allowed by the law. It is also forbidden to gain access to
the data inside the system by circumventing the security parameters without
breaking into the system.
– Chapter 34 section §9 criminalize, with a malicious intent, to import, acquire,
make, sell or distribute devices or computer software designed to harm the
operation of a computer system, communications system or a protection of a
computing system. It is also illegal to possess or distribute illegally obtained
password or other credential. This section would question the legality of
available exploitation tools. However, as the law states, the legality of such tools
depends on the intent of the user. Using them for security auditing, penetration
testing or any other way to improve cyber security with a permission from
target system owner, is legal.
3.4.2 Legal and illegal scanning methods
As the cyber security sections of criminal law are worded, intentions behind the
actions have a great role in defining legality. Scanning a system for the purpose of
finding open or vulnerable services to exploit is clearly illegal. However, scanning a
system for the purpose of security research may be considered legal as long as the
scan does not harm or interrupt the target system, and all data acquired during the
scan is kept confidential and disclosed, if needed, only with the authorities. Moreover,
the scan may not use any methods that would extract private data from inside the
system boundaries.
Querying a selected set of devices and probing a small set of ports to acquire
identification data directly available, without using any exploitive measures or unsafe
scanning methods, and used only for security research purposes, can be considered
legal. The scanner may also login to the system without using any credentials, e.g. by
utilizing anonymous FTP access, or query HTTP server for public content. However,
further intrusive scanning for these services may be illegal including gathering any
user data protected by privacy laws. Intrusive scanning inside private networks is
also forbidden which limits the scanner to finding only devices that are directly
connected to the Internet.
If possible, the scanned target owners should be informed about the scan be-
forehand. Disclosing scanning methods and transparent communication between all
parties reduces the risk of unnecessary investigations of a possible hacking attempt.
Larger scanning events, up to nation wide, should be coordinated with authorities
in advance in order to keep everyone involved up-to-date and to ensure smooth
information exchange.
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3.5 Summary
Successful identification of an ICS device requires sending precise probing requests
to available network services for identifying information, combined with other data
sources, e.g. operating system detection and geolocation. Most common ICS protocols
have integrated methods for extracting system identifiers from the device but the
scanner should be careful not to overburden the device or network with probing
packets. Also, only safe probing methods should be used to avoid interrupting the
normal operation of the target system. Scanning procedures have to respect the
regional laws set to protect the safety and privacy of computer systems and thus
adjust scanning methods accordingly.
After collecting a sufficient amount of identifying fingerprints, the device is ready
to be identified and classified. For that, a reliable decision making model and a
classifier is needed. In the next chapter, a model for ICS device assessment and
classification is proposed.
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4 Model for ICS device identification and classifi-
cation
In this chapter, a model for ICS device identification and classification is presented.
Major system components are defined and methods for data source analysis are
proposed. A system following this model is able to scan a set of ICS target hosts
and analyze device fingerprints to assess device identification. Additionally, the
system combines a list of available services, detected software vulnerabilities and
device location to assess device threat level. However, this model focuses on device
assessment and does not define additional supplementary components needed to
integrate with other cyber security systems.
First, the target device is scanned for service fingerprinting and operating system
detection. After successful device fingerprinting the collected data is filtered, con-
densed and refined into a unified structure. The scanner saves results into a report
which will then be processed by a classifier. Classification process evaluates the
data based on predefined rulesets and makes an overall assessment of device model
and system threat level. For devices assessed to be serious cyber security threats,
additional actions will be taken.
4.1 System components
The base system consists of two main components: a scalable pool of scanning nodes
and a classifier. The nodes can be distributed in different networks and they can
process allocated scan jobs individually in parallel. For each assigned job a report file
is compiled which contains all scan results with additional scan metadata. Figure 7
illustrates the system architecture and data flow in higher level.
4.1.1 Scanner
Each scanning node has a copy of the scanning software. They get scan assignments as
jobs which contains a set of target hosts or subnets to be scanned and scan parameters
which determine the ports and services to be scanned on each target host. Nodes can
scan multiple target hosts in parallel to save time. After determining which ports are
open, the scanner proceeds with service scan in selected target ports and extracts
fingerprints from services. Service scanning modules handle sending appropriate
probing packets to the device, receiving responses, extracting fingerprinting markers
from response data and formatting service scan results into a unified data structure
containing fingerprints as key-value pairs, as illustrated in chapter 3. After each
target host has been scanned, a report file is compiled and sent to the classifier for
analysis.
There are several popular port scanner software that could be used to scan ICS
devices. In this section, three popular scanners are compared: ZMap, Scanrand and
Nmap.
ZMap is a powerful open source port scanner which utilizes efficient asynchronous
scanning methods bypassing kernel packet interfaces and directly writing frames
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Figure 7: A process for ICS device assessment
to the network hardware. ZMap tries to maximize network link utilization by not
using advanced traffic flow features, e.g. connection tracking, retransmissions or
rate limiting. Instead it sends out probes as fast as it can. According to a paper
published in 2013, ZMap is capable of scanning the entire IPv4 address space in under
45 minutes by using an ordinary gigabit Ethernet connection without specialized
hardware or kernel modules. That is 1300 times faster than Nmap with default
settings while achieving similar accuracy. [39]
Another asynchronous scanner called Scanrand is, according to their paper [40],
able to reach speeds of six times faster than Nmap without losing accuracy. Scanrand,
just like ZMap, utilizes multi-threaded architecture where packet sending and receiving
are handled by separate threads running concurrently.
It is worth noting that the maximum scanning speed of ZMap assumed only one
port to be scanned per target host. [39] Increasing the number of target ports will
slow the scanner down while it has to wait for server responses. Most embedded
hardware have prioritized responses to external interfaces lower to save resources for
internal real-time process control functions. Therefore it is safe to assume that the
scanner has to wait for response from an embedded HTTP server or ICS protocol
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connection for up to several seconds. Without extensive multi-threading, the internal
worker pool of the scanner will be exhausted, effectively slowing the overall scan down.
With UDP connections, the wait can be even longer and require retransmissions of
lost packets.
Nmap, while being the slowest and synchronous scanner, has several features
missing in ZMap and Scanrand. With default settings, Nmap uses polite rate limiting
algorithms that do not disrupt sensitive hardware, e.g. PLCs, with fast-paced packet
probes. The scanning speed adjusts itself based on connection stability and response
times from servers. Therefore, fast responding servers increase the overall probing
speed and scan parallelism. Likewise, encountered packet loss and slow response
times in combination with retransmissions slow the probing down. Additionally,
Nmap has a feature-rich scripting engine based on Lua programming language which
enables the scanner to perform complex service scan routines in both text-based
and binary protocols. Nmap also has a large library of helper functions to ease
probing of several common protocols, e.g. HTTP and FTP. The scripting feature
is essential for scanning ICS devices because most identification data has to be
queried by using proprietary protocols which are not supported in scanner software
themselves. Therefore, Nmap was selected to be used in the prototype scanner
featured in chapter 5 and multiple ICS specific scanning scripts were made to utilize
its internal scripting engine. [41]
4.1.2 Classifier
A classification model is needed to solve the problem of identifying which of the
categories the scanned device belongs to. In the case on device identification, the
observed device can be assigned into a multitude of categories based on device
type, manufacturer, model or purpose. On the other hand, device also represents
a possible cyber security threat and therefore it should be assigned into the right
threat level category based on device location, exposed vulnerabilities or available
network services.
Classifier reads the scan report received from a scanning node and analyses
scanned target hosts. The report is parsed and each scanned service is analyzed
individually before combining results and assessing target threat level. There are two
main classification categories to choose from: rule-based classification and statistical
machine learning classification. Both approaches have their pros and cons which will
be discussed next.
– Rule-based classification relies of manually formed rulesets that classify targets
based on matched rules. For each identifiable device type a new ruleset entry
has to be made. In most cases simple keyword matching rules are sufficient
to identify a device as a certain make and model. As the ruleset grows, it
becomes harder and more time-consuming to maintain but the amount of
effort needed can be considered acceptable for a relatively small number of ICS
device types. The real benefit of rule-based classification is the simplicity of
classifier implementation: typically the classifier contains only a mechanism for
fingerprint comparison and handlers for each rule type used.
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– Machine learning algorithms classify by making predictions based on decision
boundaries accumulated during training phase. Algorithms are able to make
generalizations and learn relations between different variables. Machine learning
algorithms are able to adapt to new situations or new device types whereas rule-
based classification requires explicit new rules added by an expert. However, a
certain amount of data science expertise is needed to apply machine learning
in device detection whereas rule-based matching is relatively simple to set
up. Machine learning algorithms can be one of two types: supervised learning
or unsupervised learning. Supervised learning algorithm is adjusted by a
training set of correctly observed and validated detections. On the other
hand, unsupervised learning algorithm, also known as clustering, does not
need a training set but it is more suitable for summarizing and explaining the
differences between observed device categories than actually making correct
identifications.
In this thesis, a simple rule-based classifier was selected for implemented prototype
scanner because of the scarcity of available training data and the lack of experience
with machine learning algorithms. Currently no complete database of available ICS
devices does publicly exist which would make machine learning algorithms hard to
properly configure without an appropriate training data set.
4.1.3 Additional components
In this section, additional components for the model are proposed. These components
are not part of the base model but they add value to the overall system functionality.
Moreover, some of the components presented do not comply with the current leg-
islation of Finland; however, they are valid when executed with the consent of the
target system owner.
– A dispatcher and control server is needed to manage the operation of distributed
scanning nodes and handle the data exchange between scanners and the classifier
node. An integrated management system is used to add new target addresses
or subnets and to monitor the system operation.
– A checker for default credentials would be a useful part of more intrusive
service scan mode. The scanner would try to brute force login attempts with a
pre-compiled list of default user names and passwords for the particular device
model. In case of a successful login, the scanner would also try to figure out
the purpose of the device as part of system threat assessment. Vendors ship
units configured with well-known default passwords which may not be changed
during the installation process. Checking devices for weak passwords would
be a useful way to find vulnerable systems. Unfortunately, such methods are
currently considered illegal.
– In addition to the vulnerability assessment, the scanner could also test whether
potentially detected vulnerabilities have been patched on the device. This
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method would require exploiting a possible remote vulnerability on the de-
vice software. This method is also highly illegal but would complement the
vulnerability analysis.
– The classifier could have a separate module producing statistics of exposed
vulnerable automation control systems. The collected statistics would be
automatically shared with authorities and therefore improve the national cyber
situational awareness. The module could also include reporting functions for
device owners.
4.2 Data sources for device assessment
The importance of an ICS device depends on more than just the type of the device.
Two identical devices in different environments could have differing threat levels if,
e.g. one of the devices controls manufacturing utilities in a workshop whereas the
other is used to regulate power grid. Separating critical devices from non-critical ones
is a constant challenge while being the most important part of detecting exposed
vulnerable devices on the Internet.
Automatic threat assessment system is an integral part of device classification.
Accurate assessments without human interaction is a difficult task: device importance
is a balanced combination of device type, location and device vulnerability. An
automated system featured in figure 7 relies on reliable analysis of each aspect. Next,
possible analysis models for device importance are presented.
4.2.1 Location analysis
Device location can be extracted from the device itself by probing available services
or by resolving the location data associated with device’s IP address. As explained in
chapter 3, several popular ICS protocols reveal the device location if it is configured
on the device. A suitable keyword search could be able to flag important devices
on specific location based on these descriptive protocol fields. Another approach
is to resolve who-is database and GeoIP locations associated with the IP address.
However, as stated previously in chapter 3, the IP address could be registered to
an ISP that is hesitant to disclose customer identities without a request from the
authorities.
In the model, resolved location info, e.g. country and city, is passed on to the
classifier to help assess device criticality.
4.2.2 Service analysis and operating system detection
Most useful fingerprints come from direct service probing analysis. The scan report
contains all the data extracted from available network services on target host. After
being formatted into a unified form, typically key-value pairs, rules of different types
can be targeted to the data. Most rules are of keyword based pattern matching
type, targeting software versions, vendor names and device models but other rule
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types, e.g. software version number comparison, are possible. By combining several
matched keyword rules a positive identification can be made for the device.
Detected operating system name can be useful in device identification. Nmap
OS detection database, presented in chapter 3, has entries with variable granularity
and therefore the most probable match can be either an operating system name
or an exact device model. By combining keyword search results between service
analysis and operating system detection, a more precise identification result can be
reached. Device name and the set of detected services are a great factor in assessing
the criticality of the exposed device.
4.2.3 Vulnerability analysis
After extracting software versions from service scan data and detected operating
system, a check for non-patched vulnerabilities could be made. Most announced
software vulnerabilities have a Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) number
and a specific vulnerability description of affected software products and versions.
For each installed software products a check against version number reveals relevant
vulnerabilities. A list of compiled vulnerabilities can be passed on to the classifier
which will elevate the overall threat level if needed.
4.3 Tasks after assessment
After devices have been identified and threat level assessed, a report is compiled
containing every analyzed device. Each device entry combines the assessed threat
level with device information, e.g. IP address, location, device name or operating
system, open ports and identified services. The report is inspected for devices with
high threat level. For these devices, an alert procedure is triggered. The model itself
does not define how an alert should be made or what contents it has.
Unfortunately, in most cases, the owner or organization holding the device cannot
be found by direct scanning methods. The device may not contain any information
about the location and geolocating the IP address may be too inaccurate. ISPs hold
records for IP address leases but they are under strict confidentiality and won’t be
disclosed unless requested by the authorities as a part of investigation. Even if the
vulnerable device is located successfully, there is no guarantee that anything will
happen to secure it. As pointed out in chapter 2, cyber security is not taken seriously
enough in the industry, therefore it is likely that nothing will be done to improve the
situation. If the system in case is operating reliably despite the cyber security issues,
the owner is likely to ignore any warnings or will postpone the required upgrade
indefinitely. It will require a national effort to raise awareness about the need of
better cyber security policies. Until then, plenty of devices are and will be potential
targets for malicious actors.
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4.4 Problems with the model
The usefulness of this model depends on the ability to successfully scan and identify
exposed vulnerable ICS devices. Successful scan requires that the right combination
of open ports is detected and thorough service scan is performed on each port. If the
device does not respond to the scanner probes as expected, fingerprint data will be
lost and proper identification may not be possible or identification is only partial.
Successful identification needs properly made and maintained identification rule-
sets that trigger on right fingerprint markers. The system can only identify devices
that have correct identification rules in the database. Effective operation of the
identification process requires a large library of device rules for every vendor. As
there is no concise descriptive collection of every ICS device available, it can be
assumed that most ICS devices would remain undetected until the database is built
up. Easy ruleset database management tools are essential for convenience in adding
new device rules. Partial identifications are problematic because, in some cases,
scan results do not contain enough fingerprints for full identification of the device.
Resulting identification may contain only device vendor name or just software version
the device is running. False positive identifications are not a problem as long as
rulesets are strict enough and vague rules are removed from the database.
Because of the simplistic nature of scanning nodes, they do not perform any
identification matching but only collect scan data and provide it to the classifier.
This keeps the overall architecture clean but causes more load on the classifier host
which does all the analysis work. On the other hand, scanning nodes are lightweight
and easily deployable when needed.
4.5 Summary
An integrated model for ICS device identification and classification is a viable way to
probe and detect exposed vulnerable ICS devices on the Internet. Device detection
combined with location information creates a basis for finding critical exposed systems.
The effectiveness of this proposed model is based on the robustness of service scan
scripts and the vastness of identification rule database. Without a properly build
device identification database, a lot of ICS devices go unnoticed. More research is
needed for methods to automatically resolve accurate context, e.g. location combined
with device purpose, for the target device. Otherwise, the resulting device assessment
consists mostly of device identification without any information about its importance.
This part of the model remains as a challenge for future research work.
In the next chapter, a proof of concept prototype scanner and classifier is presented.
It implements the core parts of the model presented in this chapter and leaves more
advanced features, e.g. vulnerability analysis, for future work.
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5 Proof of concept
A prototype scanner and classifier software was made to test the viability of the
model presented in previous chapter 4. This chapter presents a working prototype
which implements the core model, leaving the more advanced features for future
work. The operating principle and key features of the prototype are discussed. The
prototype was tested with both simulated virtual devices and real devices directly
connected to the Internet. The testing in real network environment was carried out
by querying Shodan with 41 distinctive keywords to gather a sample of common
ICS devices exposed to the Internet. Country filters were applied to restrict the test
scans to Finland. The chapter is concluded with presentation of scan results and
discussion of issues encountered during prototype testing.
5.1 Operating principle
The prototype has the core features of the model implemented, separated into two
software modules: a scanner which does the target scanning and a classifier which
analyses scan results. Figure 8 illustrates the operation of each component and data
flow between them.
Figure 8: A proof of concept prototype
The scanner performs port scan on selected TCP and UDP ports generally used
in ICS devices. Additionally, it can run a selection of more in-depth service scans
to extract useful information from devices. The scanner is programmed in Python
language and an external libnmap toolkit library is used to launch the Nmap port
scanner process, retrieve results and compile an easy-to-parse report structure for later
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analysis. Service probing scans are performed with a set of specifically crafted Nmap
Scripting Engine (NSE) scripts programmed in Lua language. In this prototype,
a set of NSE scripts specifically designed to scan ICS devices were acquired from
Redpoint research project. These scripts were used as the base for service scan logic;
however, they were modified to suit the needs of the scanner. [33]
The classifier takes a scan report file from the scanner as an input. After reading
the report it loads identification rulesets and a detection database, and analyses
scanned hosts one-by-one. Analysis results can be saved into an output file for further
processing.
5.1.1 Scanning procedure
The scanner starts by reading input arguments from command line. Arguments
include scan target selection, ports to be scanned, invocation of an optional HTTP
server to inform about the scan in progress and the selection of service scan scripts.
By default, no service scans are performed without explicitly requested which keeps
the scanner operation non-intrusive by nature. Preset arguments are included to
conveniently select a common set of ICS services with a single argument. The scanner
is able to read scan targets from a file in order to save the effort of listing them one
at the time as command line arguments.
After input arguments have been set, the informative HTTP server is started, if
requested with a command line switch. Command line arguments are then compiled
into a Nmap argument string and the scan is started in a background thread. In
the port discovery stage, Nmap performs TCP SYN and UDP scan methods to
probe open ports on each target host. Additionally, operating system discovery
probes are sent at this stage. After open ports have been discovered, selected service
scan scripts are launched based on port rule matching. Each script handles the use
of network functions and data management individually: sending probe packets,
receiving responses from target host, parsing response data, and compiling scan
result table. Service scan scripts use a structured output table to organize service
fingerprints which are stored as nested elements inside of XML output format.
The scanner has been preconfigured with presets for ICS specific port selection
and script support. The presets select 16 TCP ports and 2 UDP ports to be scanned
for service discovery. Table 1 shows the default selection of ICS ports for the scanner.
After each target host has been scanned, a report is compiled. Report is formed
as a libnmap report object data structure and it contains scan header metadata with
a list of host objects. Each host object contains the scan results for the target host.
The libnmap library contains programming interfaces for easy parsing of the report
object which is later utilized in the classifier module. If requested in command line
arguments, the report is saved into a file. Otherwise, the report is parsed and the
contents printed to terminal output.
5.1.2 Classification procedure
The classifier begins by reading identification rulesets and detection database from
configuration files. After that it opens the specified scan report file and performs host
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Service Port
FTP tcp/21
SSH tcp/22
Telnet tcp/23
HTTP tcp/80/81/8000/8080
Siemens S7 tcp/102
SNMP udp/161
HTTPS tcp/443
Modbus/TCP tcp/502
Niagara Fox tcp/1911
Phoenix Contact ILC tcp/1962
Omron FINS tcp/9600
Lantronix tcp/9999
ProConOS tcp/20547
Ethernet/IP tcp/44818
Bacnet udp/47808
Table 1: A preset selection of ICS service ports
classifications. By default, every target host found in scan report will be classified
unless a list of target hosts are provided as a command line argument. In that case,
only selected target hosts are classified and the others are ignored.
In the first phase, the classifier iterates over each scanned host in the scan report
and matches them against the identification rulesets. OS matching, GeoIP location
matching and service scan matching are performed separately because the data fields
reside in separate structures in the scan report. Service specific identification rules
are grouped based on the port number of the service. Additionally, there is a generic
ruleset for rules non-specific for any particular service. Every service scan fingerprint,
presented as a key-value pair, is processed against service specific rules and generic
rules: a rule can target specific key or it can be generic. If a rule matches against
a fingerprint entry, the matched rule id is added to the rule list for the host, the
host point counter is incremented by the cost of the rule, and the host threat level is
elevated if the matched rule has higher level than the host currently has.
In the second phase, the matched rule list for each analyzed host is compared
against the detection database. Each detection rule is a combinational logic (AND,
OR) set of identification rule identifiers. If the detection entry matches against the
matched rule list for the host, a positive detection has been made. Each host can
have multiple positive detections based on detected device name, manufacturer name,
available service or other detectable quality. This relaxed nature of detection process
enables detectability for host features of several granularity.
After each host has been processed, analysis results can be written into a file for
later usage or post-processing purposes. The prototype does not have any alerting
capabilities; therefore, it is the responsibility of other software solutions to extract
high risk targets from analysis results and proceed with appropriate action.
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5.1.3 Identification rulesets and detection database
The classifier uses two libraries for device identification and classification: a set of
identification rulesets and a detection database. The library formats are defined
next.
Identification rulesets reside in text files and each ruleset for each service, GeoIP
location or OS match is placed into a separate file. In the classifier, both GeoIP and
OS detection are handled as services. Additionally, there is a generic ruleset for rules
that can apply to any port or service. Each line in a ruleset defines one fingerprint
rule. A rule is a set of rule type, rule target, rule item, rule cost, rule severity and
rule id.
– Rule type defines how the rule is processed when matching. In the prototype
classifier, keyword type is the most common while there are also rule types for
version number comparison. However, the classifier does not put any restrictions
on rule types and more types can be added by including additional rule type
handlers into the classifier code.
– Rule target is the service scan fingerprint key which the rule applies to. If
target is ‘generic’ then the rule is matched against any key.
– Rule item is the actual rule data (keyword, integer) which is compared against
the fingerprint value.
– Rule cost is a predetermined cost associated with the rule. If the rule matches
then host specific point counter is incremented accordingly. This value has no
specific purpose in the prototype classifier but can be used to find interesting
targets.
– Rule severity defines the threat level this rule represents. It can be either
‘Unspecified’, ‘Low’, ‘Medium’, ‘High’ or ‘Critical’. When the rule is matched,
the threat level of the host is elevated to correspond the highest matched
identification rule.
– Rule ID is the unique UUID identifier associated with the rule. This identifier
is used to separate rules from each other; therefore, it is crucial that UUID
collisions do not happen in rulesets.
Detection database is located in a separate file. Detection database contains the
predefined detections of a device or software. Each detection rule is a combinational
set of identification rule identifiers. Each rule is a set of rule name, rule certainty
and the list of identification rule UUIDs.
– Rule name provides the string representation of detection (i.e. device name or
server software name). There can be several made detections with the same
name so that the same device or software can be detected in many different
ways.
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– Rule certainty specifies the certainty of detection in a percentage value from
0 to 100. This enables the use of alternative detection rules with different
detection levels, each with different subset of fingerprinting rules.
– List of rules defines the collection of identification rules used to make a detection
match. Rules in the file format are separated either with a semicolon (AND) or
a colon (OR), e.g. A;B:C states that detection requires rule A and either rule
B or rule C to match. UUID identifiers are used to represent rules in this list.
5.1.4 Classifier output
After successful scan report analysis, the results can be written into a file in a CSV
type format. Each line represents one analyzed host. A host is skipped if it is down or
it has no open ports. Host entry contains following fields, separated with semicolons:
– Host alert level is the analyzed alert level of the host based on matched rules.
It can be ‘Unspecified’, ‘Low’, ‘Medium’, ‘High’ or ‘Critical’.
– The IP address of the analyzed host.
– The Domain Name System (DNS) host name associated with it’s address. If
there is no host name, the IP address is presented here.
– The GeoIP resolved city for the IP address. ‘None’ if city name cannot be
resolved.
– The GeoIP resolved country for the IP address. ‘None’ if country name cannot
be resolved.
– The identified OS running in host. Alternatively, a device name if Nmap
OS detection is able to determine that. ‘None’ if there is no OS fingerprints
available.
– A list of open ports (TCP or UDP) available in the host.
– A list of (detection, detection certainty) tuples gathered during host analysis.
Resulting file is easy to parse with common text interpreter tools. A list of hosts
with high or critical threat level is simple to extract from the file and an alerting
procedure can be invoked if needed.
5.2 Testing in virtual environment
Initial testing was conducted by using a honeypot software in virtual machine environ-
ment. This enabled agility in software development and continuous testing for feature
validation and finding bugs. Honeypot systems simulate real industrial hardware or
other attractive systems for attackers. Instead of controlling any industrial process
or providing any actual service, they deceive attackers and record their actions in
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a safe and controlled manner. Conpot is a popular ICS/SCADA honeypot that
is able to simulate an ICS PLC using multiple IP network protocols. It supports
S7comm, Modbus, BACnet, IPMI, HTTP and SNMP protocols thus providing an
excellent target for scanner testing purposes. Listing 15 presents a starting Conpot
honeypot system and service initialization. The honeypot has versatile configuration
possibilities and supports the addition of new protocols as software modules. [42]
Listing 15: Conpot honeypot starting
# conpot --template default
_
___ ___ ___ ___ ___| |_
| _| . | | . | . | _|
|___|___|_|_| _|___|_|
|_|
Version 0.5.1
MushMush Foundation
2015 -11 -08 11:24:02 ,150 Starting Conpot using template: /usr/local/lib/python2 .7/
dist -packages/Conpot -0.5.0 - py2.7. egg/conpot/templates/default
2015 -11 -08 11:24:02 ,150 Starting Conpot using configuration found in: /usr/local/
lib/python2 .7/dist -packages/Conpot -0.5.0 - py2.7. egg/conpot/conpot.cfg
2015 -11 -08 11:24:02 ,291 Fetched xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx as external ip.
2015 -11 -08 11:24:02 ,295 Found and enabled (’modbus ’, <class conpot.protocols.modbus
.modbus_server.ModbusServer at 0x7fe0d70a27a0 >) protocol.
2015 -11 -08 11:24:02 ,299 Conpot S7Comm initialized
2015 -11 -08 11:24:02 ,299 Found and enabled (’s7comm ’, <class ’conpot.protocols.
s7comm.s7_server.S7Server ’>) protocol.
2015 -11 -08 11:24:02 ,300 Found and enabled (’http ’, <class ’conpot.protocols.http.
web_server.HTTPServer ’>) protocol.
2015 -11 -08 11:24:02 ,301 Found and enabled (’snmp ’, <class ’conpot.protocols.snmp.
snmp_server.SNMPServer ’>) protocol.
2015 -11 -08 11:24:02 ,302 Conpot Bacnet initialized using the /usr/local/lib/python2
.7/dist -packages/Conpot -0.5.0 - py2 .7.egg/conpot/templates/default/bacnet/bacnet.
xml template.
2015 -11 -08 11:24:02 ,303 Found and enabled (’bacnet ’, <class ’conpot.protocols.
bacnet.bacnet_server.BacnetServer ’>) protocol.
2015 -11 -08 11:24:02 ,304 IPMI BMC initialized.
2015 -11 -08 11:24:02 ,305 Conpot IPMI initialized using /usr/local/lib/python2 .7/dist
-packages/Conpot -0.5.0 - py2.7. egg/conpot/templates/default/ipmi/ipmi.xml
template
2015 -11 -08 11:24:02 ,305 Found and enabled (’ipmi ’, <class ’conpot.protocols.ipmi.
ipmi_server.IpmiServer ’>) protocol.
2015 -11 -08 11:24:02 ,305 No proxy template found. Service will remain unconfigured/
stopped.
2015 -11 -08 11:24:02 ,305 Modbus server started on: (’0.0.0.0’, 502)
2015 -11 -08 11:24:02 ,306 S7Comm server started on: (’0.0.0.0’, 102)
2015 -11 -08 11:24:02 ,306 HTTP server started on: (’0.0.0.0’, 80)
2015 -11 -08 11:24:02 ,461 SNMP server started on: (’0.0.0.0’, 161)
2015 -11 -08 11:24:02 ,462 Bacnet server started on: (’0.0.0.0’, 47808)
2015 -11 -08 11:24:02 ,462 IPMI server started on: (’0.0.0.0’, 623)
2015 -11 -08 11:24:07 ,307 Privileges dropped , running as "nobody:nobody"
To test the scanner, a Conpot honeypot was installed to a Debian Linux virtual
machine and scanned. Listing 16 shows a successful scanning and detection of the
honeypot masquerading as a Siemens Simatic S7-200 PLC device. In addition to
testing with a single honeypot, a virtual network containing several concurrently
running Conpot instances was created to test the parallel scanning capabilities of
the prototype scanner.
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Listing 16: Detecting a honeypot system
====== Analysing host 10.0.0.10 (debian -honeypot) ======
GeoIP information not available.
=== PORT 80 ===
-> Port 80 (http) is open. (+1 point)
Analyse service scan result:
status : HTTP /1.1 200 OK
content -length : 575
request type : GET
title : Overview - Siemens , SIMATIC , S7 -200
-> Keyword match: ’s7 -200’ (+20 points , severity: Medium)
-> Keyword match: ’simatic ’ (+20 points , severity: Medium)
set -cookie : path=/
last -modified : Tue , 19 May 1993 09:00:00 GMT
location : /index.html
date : Mon , 26 Oct 2015 15:12:59 GMT
content -type : text/html
=== PORT 102 ===
-> Port 102 (iso -tsap) is open. (+1 point)
Analyse service scan result:
Version : 0.0
Copyright : Original Siemens Equipment
Module Type : Siemens , SIMATIC , S7 -200
-> Keyword match: ’s7 -200’ (+20 points , severity: Medium)
-> Keyword match: ’simatic ’ (+20 points , severity: Medium)
Plant Identification : Mouser Factory
Serial Number : 88111222
System Name : Technodrome
=== PORT 502 ===
-> Port 502 (modbus) is open. (+1 point)
Analyse service scan result:
sid 0x1 : {’Device identification ’: ’Siemens SIMATIC S7 -200’, ’Error ’: ’ILLEGAL
FUNCTION ’}
-> Keyword match: ’s7 -200’ (+20 points , severity: Medium)
-> Keyword match: ’simatic ’ (+20 points , severity: Medium)
=== PORT 161 ===
-> Port 161 (snmp) is open. (+1 point)
Analyse service scan result:
1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1.0 : Siemens , SIMATIC , S7 -200
-> Keyword match: ’s7 -200’ (+20 points , severity: Medium)
-> Keyword match: ’simatic ’ (+20 points , severity: Medium)
-> Keyword match: ’simatic ’ (+5 points , severity: Medium)
Analysis result (1 hosts):
Host: 10.0.0.10 (debian -honeypot)
Open ports: [80, 102, 502, 161]
Ruleset: 102, Points: 41
Ruleset: 80, Points: 41
Ruleset: 502, Points: 41
Ruleset: 161, Points: 46
Total points: 169
Threat level: Medium
Possible identification: Siemens Simatic device (90% certainty)
Possible identification: Siemens Simatic S7 -200 PLC (90% certainty)
5.3 Scanning in Finland
After successful testing phase in a virtual honeypot environment, a larger scan
experiment was commenced to test the prototype in real environment. The scanner
was modified to provide a static web page informing about the scans made in
conjunction with a research project, providing contact information and a list of time
intervals when scanning took place. This was done for the purpose of transparency
44
and to dispel any concerns of malicious intent.
5.3.1 Target selection
For the target selection, the same set of 41 distinctive ICS keywords were used to
query Shodan for scan target acquisition that were used to find the most popular
ICS devices in chapter 2. To limit the scan scope inside Finnish borders, a country
filter was applied to Shodan search terms. After record extraction and removal of
duplicate addresses, a set of targets were ready to be scanned. Shodan was queried
4 times in late 2015 with same keywords to refresh the target set monthly. Test
scan was run several times during the testing period from early October to early
December. Scan reports were saved from each scan for later analysis.
5.3.2 Scan results
The scan results are presented in table 2. It contains a metric called detection
ratio, defined in equation 1. Detection ratio is a metric for classifier efficiency by
comparing the amount of detected devices or services to the devices available to be
detected. However, it does not take into account partial detections and therefore has
limited usability. Additionally, the overall figure of detected devices contains also
detected devices or computers that were not actual ICS devices. In most cases the
non-ICS device was an ordinary PC, usually detected as a Windows machine, that
had received the same IP address from ISP that was previously leased to an ICS
device.
Date 02.10. 16.10. 21.10. 11.11. 25.11. 04.12.
Nr. of targets 1768 1783 1783 1631 1631 2238
Targets up 1545 1600 1564 1434 1410 1973
Targets with open ports 1447 1543 1504 1373 1240 1726
Targets identified overall 1012 1118 1365 1254 1217 1703
Targets identified as ICS 1012 693 1087 1135 1217 1703
Detection ratio 0,70 0,72 0,91 0,91 0,98 0,99
Table 2: Scan results for Finnish target hosts
Detection ratio = Targets identified overallTargets with open ports (1)
Observations on scan result statistics:
– The amount of target IP addresses received from Shodan varies from month to
month. Shodan tries to keep the database fresh by constant scanning cycles
on the Internet. There is a significant drop in targets with open ports on scan
results from 16.10. to 21.10. (down 2,5%) and from 11.11 to 25.11. (down
9,4%) indicating that IP addresses were reallocated in between those dates.
Queried IP addresses do seem to get out-of-date very fast due to dynamic
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address allocation provided by ISPs. Therefore, it is suggested to refresh target
addresses just before each scan.
– The efficiency of detection was greatly improved during the fall. This was
because of constant development on scan scripts which resulted in more reliable
service scan performance, increasing the quantity of available service scan
fingerprints.
– During the scans 13% to 24% of targets were either down or didn’t have any
open port. However, in Shodan records the search engine found open services
successfully in all of them. There are several possible explanations for this:
Shodan has implemented less obvious scanning techniques, the devices become
off-line occasionally and connect to the network only when transmitting data,
or Shodan has a large quantity of out-of-date entries in its database.
Detected device types
The classifier was able to provide a detection for a device or service in 99% of the
cases. If the device or computer provided multiple detectable services, each one of
them could be detected individually. This means that the device can have multiple
classifications based on detection rules available. Detection is also possible in various
granularities. The same device can be detected as ‘Siemens Simatic’ device but can
additionally have a more precise ‘Siemens Simatic S7-200’ classification because of
the extra available fingerprint.
A total of 64 detection rules were made as a part of the prototype development
to detect a selection of ICS devices and services. In most cases a reliable detection
of a device needs only one good fingerprint entry. The same information is usually
available through several network services, e.g. SNMP system description in addition
to traditional ICS specific fingerprint. Table 3 provides a sample of what device
types the classifier was able to detect.
Device type Purpose Amount
ATM/EZ-IP Security gateway 95
Centraline Building automation 12
Digi One SP Serial-to-Ethernet gateway 64
Ouman EH-Net, WebSCADA Building automation 31
Schneider TSX Industrial automation 3
Siemens Simatic S7, HMI and NET Industrial automation 9
TAC Xenta 511, 711, 911, 913 Building automation 342
Westermo EDW-100 Serial-to-Ethernet gateway 32
Windows CE Fidelix Building automation 359
Wisepro Building automation 3
Vykon QNX Building automation 171
Table 3: A sample of detected device types
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Identification rules used
Only a small amount of identification rules were needed to detect devices. In most
cases it was beneficial to make a generic rule that can apply to any protocol available
instead of a targeted protocol specific rule. That way the same keyword is searched in
fingerprints generated from any protocol or service. This is especially useful feature
for HTTP and Telnet fingerprint matching because the service can be in a multitude
of different port numbers.Table 4 shows the amounts of identification rules used when
detecting the devices against Shodan database records.
Port 21 22 23 102 161 502 1911 9999 44818 Generic
Amount 4 2 11 2 14 2 5 2 1 42
Table 4: Identification rules per protocol
Open ports
While the open port does not directly indicate the available service on host, stan-
dardized port numbers can implicate the types of available services. Combinations
of certain port numbers can be used to evaluate the nature of the device and de-
vices considered important can be selected for more advanced service scans. The
distribution of open ports for December 2015 scan is presented in figure 9. A total
of 2238 hosts were scanned in which 512 hosts did not have any ports open. This
portion, 22,9% of all scanned hosts, were either protected by firewall or were not
ICS devices at all. As stated before, Shodan database loses freshness quickly which
means that a sizable amount of these devices were most likely some other devices
that had acquired the dynamic IP address previously leased by an ICS device.
Figure 9: Distribution of open ports, December 2015
For those 1726 devices having at least one port open, almost 95% of them had
port 80 open which suggests a responding HTTP server. Most modern devices have
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a web management interface implemented which explains the high number. Other
interesting and popular ports were port 21 (FTP, 1002 hosts), port 23 (Telnet, 819
hosts), port 443 (HTTPS, 451 hosts) and port 161 (SNMP, 361 hosts). FTP and
Telnet are vulnerable, non-encrypted protocols that should be either replaced by
modern alternatives or removed from use. Likewise, SNMP is a dangerous protocol
that should be protected.
Ports 1911, 502, 47808 and 102 are directly linked to ICS related devices. A
significant amount of Niagara Fox automation devices, 190 hosts, were responding
to the public Internet. Similarly, Modbus devices (port 502), Ethernet/IP devices
(port 47808) and S7comm devices (port 102) are possibly vulnerable and should
be protected by firewalls. Remote access to these devices must be restricted to
secure VPN connections only. Whether these protocols are accessible because of a
configuration mistake or intentionally, having them available exposes the devices to
malicious actors.
Open port combinations
Table 5 represents the most popular open port combinations during the December
2015 scan. Most devices run a standardized set of software with little or no control
over what services run on the device. Therefore, devices of similar type or model
tend to provide a similar set of network services and hence have same combinations
of open ports. While open port combinations do not provide additional identification
information as such, it can be used in cluster analysis when evaluating device
classification.
Port combination Amount
21, 23, 80 536
80 193
21, 80, 443, 161 181
80, 1911 150
21, 80, 443 81
23, 80 76
80, 443, 161 69
21, 23, 80, 161 52
21, 23, 80, 8080 41
80, 8080 39
Table 5: 10 most popular open port combinations, December 2015
Scanning times
Scanning took significantly more time than expected in the beginning of prototype
development. Scanning times for each scan attempt are presented in table 6. Most
of the slowness is due to Nmap’s synchronous scanning methods which progress in
a fixed sequence. The use of UDP scanning forces Nmap to wait for timeouts on
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non-responsive hosts. Additionally, operating system detection adds up to several
seconds of scan time on each target host and service scan scripts also take their own
time to process. Overall, the scanner setup is not optimized for speed but to get
the most precise scan results possible. The scanning speed varied between scanning
attempts from 3,5 seconds per host to over 5 seconds per host. There seems to
be no correlation between the amount of targets and the overall scan time which
could mean that Nmap parallelization is sub-optimal and the overall performance
depends on external factors, e.g. network condition. Optimizing Nmap scanning
options and reducing timeout periods would help the scanner to perform faster in the
expense of not finding as many vulnerable hosts. The best way to improve overall
scanning capacity is to distribute targets among a larger pool of scanning nodes,
each operating individually in parallel and thus bringing the overall scan time down.
Date 02.10. 16.10. 21.10. 11.11. 25.11. 04.12.
Scan time (s) 7396,55 9625,76 6246,02 5856,79 7439,31 11250,25
Scanned hosts 1768 1783 1783 1631 1631 2238
Time per host (s) 4,18 5,40 3,50 3,59 4,56 5,03
Table 6: Scan times
5.3.3 Encountered issues and other notes
Occasionally, for the reasons unknown, service scans failed on a few target hosts
even though the corresponding ports were open. Because of sufficiently large timeout
values used in the scanning scripts, the failure of the scan cannot be explained by a
slowly responding device. This phenomena was also studied with packet captures
and it was observed that both request probe and response were sent and received
correctly in network layer. However, for some reason, Nmap was never able to receive
the response from server. It can be assumed that compatibility between Nmap and
some server software is not 100% guaranteed and in some rare cases a response from
server is lost.
More aggressive scanning methods were disabled in service scan scripts in order
to keep the scanning safe for every target device and to respect the privacy laws to
their fullest extent. BACnet gateway can reveal additional targets when querying
BDTs and FDTs but they would most likely be inside private networks and, therefore,
out of reach for legal scanning methods. Likewise, the full address space in Modbus
networks can be probed for device discovery but hammering the network with probes
may disturb some delicate controller. Additional information is not worth risking
the reliable functionality of any automation system.
Connection timeout tweaking was a bit problematic because of several slowly
responding devices. A safe timeout for SNMP scanning was set to 15 seconds
wheres another service suffering from slow response times, Telnet, had a timeout
value set to 10 seconds. These were evaluated to be long enough without risking
unintentional connection loss from a slow device. Nmap performance options were
also experimented with; By restricting the operating system detection retries, a few
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second speedup was achieved without losing detection accuracy. Also, by increasing
the minimum host group for parallel scanning, some speedup was gained for the
overall scan job duration.
5.4 Summary
The prototype was implemented successfully based on the model presented in chap-
ter 4. The functionality was split into two modules, a scanner and a classifier. The
scanner was configured to have ICS scanning presets, targeting common network
services in ICS devices and performing an advanced service scan when possible. 16
TCP and 2 UDP ports were selected as a suitable target port set. The prototype
was tested in a virtual machine environment by scanning Conpot honeypot software
instances. After the scan results were positive, the prototype scanner was tested
in real environment. The testing was performed targeting less than 2000 Finnish
IP addresses that were queried from Shodan using a carefully selected set of ICS
related keywords. The scan was performed multiple times during late 2015 while
still improving the service scan scripts and building fingerprinting rulesets and a
detection database for the classifier. In December 2015, the classifier was able to
detect scanned devices up to 99% success rate. This was possible thanks to fine
tuned detection rulesets which were able to perform efficient matching on service
scan fingerprint entries. Long scan times was found to be a possible culprit for
larger scale scans. However, it was determined that UDP scanning combined with
operating system detection probes and additional service scans were the possible
cause of slowdown. As a solution, a distributed scanning with concurrently running
scan nodes was advised.
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6 Conclusions
The importance of securing national critical infrastructure has been recognized
worldwide in recent years. Critical facilities, e.g. power plants and factories operate
on industrial control systems that need to be protected from malicious actors. In
the past, these systems were isolated from outside networks thanks to the use of
direct serial connections between devices. Companies valued system availability and
the physical safety of equipment and personnel over information security. However,
the recent introduction of networked system architectures and remote management
connections improves cost-efficiency but exposes these automation systems to a
completely new set of cyber security threats which in turn creates pressure to bring
information security policies up-to-date. Insufficient isolation between office networks
and field automation networks enables attackers to create clever remotely executed
cyber attacks even if field networks are not directly connected to the Internet. Attacks
to high-risk targets have been rare so far but the attacks against Iranian nuclear
centrifuges [7] and a German steel mill [9] have demonstrated the potential of a
well-planned cyber attack. Shodan [19], a search engine for Internet connected devices,
has been a great asset in finding exposed ICS devices, and has helped cyber security
researchers and governmental agencies to track down and alert companies about
potential security risks. However, research based on Shodan scan databases has
revealed that the exposure of ICS devices is still a valid concern and new methods for
finding and securing vulnerable systems are in demand. The increasing popularity of
IoT is expected to make the cyber security situation even worse by bringing millions
of new devices accessible on the Internet. [20, 21]
Issues in automation cyber security are enabled by weaknesses in organizational
and technological security policies but the root cause is the inherent lack of security
features in industrial automation systems. Common ICS network protocols have
been retroactively modified to work over IP based networks but are missing proper
authentication and cryptography features in order to maintain compatibility with old
hardware. Several studies have demonstrated numerous exploits against architectural
weaknesses in these protocols. Suggested ways for cyber attack mitigation are
sufficient network isolation by firewalls and VPNs together with implementation of
proper intrusion detection systems. [17, 16]
The challenge in protecting critical automation infrastructure lies in finding the
exposed devices among billions of others connected to the Internet. Port scanning is
an effective way to fingerprint available devices based on open network services they
provide. ICS devices tend to be lightly configured and therefore provide device iden-
tification information when probed with general and ICS specific network protocols.
Vendor specific automation protocols have in most cases built-in diagnostic instruc-
tions which enables the scanner to pull device identification and other operational
information from a device. However, port scan procedures should always comply
with regional legislation to ensure the safety and privacy of computer systems even
if it means reducing the efficiency of device probing methods. In addition to port
scanning, operating system detection and geolocation data has great value in device
fingerprint.
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In this thesis, a model for ICS device assessment and classification is proposed.
This model takes in scan reports containing device probing fingerprints and analyses
multiple device features, e.g. software vulnerabilities, location and available services,
combining all results into assessed threat level and positive device identification. The
model scales well into several network sizes by adjusting the pool of scanning nodes.
Also, new analyzable features can be added to the process to increase the accuracy
of device assessment.
To validate the feasibility of the proposed model, a proof of concept prototype
was created. The prototype implements a set of key features of the model, being
able to perform elaborate service scans on target hosts and classify them based on
predefined rulesets. During the prototype development, a total of 64 detection rules
for different device types were made. After the prototype was tested with virtual
honeypot environment, a target set for testing in real environment was compiled by
searching Shodan with 41 distinctive ICS keywords. The target set was scanned 6
times in late 2015 and the successful device detection ratio improved from 70% up to
99% during the prototype development cycle. Even though the prototype was slow,
taking from 3,5 to 5 seconds per scanned host, it was fairly reliable with different
types of devices.
Future work
The prototype software was designed to be an extensible framework where new
features are easy to add. Scanner can be improved by additional service scan scripts for
new protocols and classifier functionality can be improved by adding new identification
rule types. The more advanced features of the model presented in chapter 4 but
not part in the initial prototype version, e.g. software vulnerability analysis, can
be implemented into the scanner by utilizing Nmap’s scripting engine. Also, other
features which help to assess the device purpose would be key improvements for the
future versions of the prototype. Security auditing by checking default credentials
is currently implemented for selected protocols in the prototype but the feature is
disabled by default because of its intrusive nature.
The classifier has only 64 device detection rules in its ruleset library in the initial
version. Usefulness in device detection relies on comprehensiveness of the detection
library and therefore a large set of identification rules for a wide range of ICS device
types should be compiled before using the prototype in different environments.
Another useful feature addition would be the introduction of distributed scanning
nodes as the initial version is configured to be used as a single node. Scanning nodes
can be lightweight and contain only the minimal software needed to do the scanning
jobs whereas the classifier node can operate a central server in charge of scan target
allocation between scanning nodes.
Finally, more research is needed to create mechanisms for integration between
the prototype and other security systems. An automatic system for target scanning,
classification, reporting and alerting is needed for auditing national cyberspace and
protecting critical infrastructure.
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